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Practice-Based Learning
I.	INTRODUCTION

My purpose in this article is to present a strong thesis—that practice is the
primary site of legal learning and that it should be recognized and valued as such.
Although this may sound like a trivial or obvious proposition within the ranks of
clinical legal education, I hope to make this proposition strange, perhaps even
outrageous. However, I also argue that practice might be too good a teacher and that
there is a real danger that law students and other novices will become acculturated to
substandard and even unethical norms of practice. In other words, law students may
be co-opted during their apprenticeship to practice. To help counteract this risk, I
explore ways that law schools and sites of law practice can encourage and nurture a
more critical process of acculturation and arm law students with role choices and
frames of exploration that might enable them to transform legal norms and legal
culture towards more progressive ends.
Although there is little doubt that law schools do an excellent job of turning law
school applicants into classroom students and beginning the process of cognitive and
role acculturation, contextualized practice does an infinitely better job of inculcating
the understandings, skills, and dispositions that comprise competence in the real
world, be it a job, a profession, or a service activity. Likewise, although there may be
a useful synergy or complementarity between the classroom and practice, that mutual
reinforcement occurs only if practice is placed in the foreground. In reaching this
conclusion, that performance activities in actual practice settings are crucial to
ecological learning, I draw principal support from researchers who propose that
apprenticeship-like experiences are a cornerstone of effective learning even during
formal schooling.1
1. For an extended discussion of a theory of ecological learning which I summarize in this section, see Brook

K. Baker, Beyond MacCrate: The Role of Context, Experience, Theory, and Reflection in Ecological Learning, 36
Ariz. L. Rev. 287 (1994) [hereinafter Baker, Beyond MacCrate]; Brook K. Baker, “Self ”-Directed Learning
Post-Modernized: The Role of Autonomy, Self, and Self-Realization in Law Student Work Experience (2001)
(manuscript on file with the author) [hereinafter Baker, “Self ”-Directed Learning]; Brook K. Baker, Learning
to Fish, Fishing to Learn: Guided Participation in the Interpersonal Ecology of Practice, 6 Clin. L. Rev. 1
(1999) [hereinafter Baker, Guided Participation]; Daniel J. Givelber, Brook K. Baker, Jack McDevitt, &
Robyn Miliano, Learning Through Work: An Empirical Study of Legal Internship, 45 J. Legal Educ. 1
(1995). All four of these articles cite to multiple sources including most prominently, Jerome Bruner,
Acts of Meaning (1990); John Dewey, Experience and Education (Collier Books 1963) (1938);
Gerald M. Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind (1992); Howard
Gardner, The Unschooled Mind: How Children Think and How Schools Should Teach
(1991); Diane Gillespie, The Mind’s We: Contextualism in Cognitive Psychology (1993);
George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the
Mind (1987); Jean Lave, Cognition in Practice: Mind, Mathematics and Culture in Everyday
Life (1988); Jean Lave & Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral
Participation (1991); Barbara Rogoff, Apprenticeship in Thinking: Cognitive Development in
Social Context (1990); Donald A. Schön, Educating the Reflective Practitioner: Toward a
New Design for Teaching and Learning in the Professions (1987); Donald A. Schön, The
Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (1983); Francisco J. Varela et
al., The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (1991); The Psychology of
Expertise: Cognitive Research and Empirical AI (Robert R. Hoffman ed., 1992) [hereinafter
Psychology of Expertise].
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I came to the proposition favoring practice-based learning as an experience-based
article of faith. My father went to Northeastern University in the 1940s, I went to the
law school in the 1970s, and I have taught there for nearly thirty years, and thus have
directly experienced the law school’s unique co-operative education program (four
upper-level academic quarters, alternating with four, full-time co-op placements in
legal settings under the supervision of a lawyer) first hand. Since 1993, I have written
extensively about practice-based learning for law students to test my faith and to
discover whether co-op really is the engine of learning I believed it to be. I started
with three orientations toward my research. First, that student-centered learning is
more important than educator-centered teaching and thus, that it is critical to explore
recent cognitive research about humans’ interactive engagement with the world and
about the cognitive legacies of that engagement, what we call learning. Second, that
learning should be relatively “self ”-directed and identity focused—that university
students, as maturing human beings, most of them poised between the play and
educational regimes of childhood and the social roles and responsibilities of adulthood,
are searching for increased autonomy, identity, and self-realization—a new sense of
self, of self-reliance, and of personal competence. Third, that learning is primarily
social, not solo. It is not something that occurs just in the head but that it arises out of
social practice, out of coordinated action within a community of mentors and peers
that is organized to provide vertical and lateral support to new members as they jointly
undertake the authentic activities of their practice domain.
In the course of my research and out of these orientations, I discovered three
major misconceptions about learning in dominant forms of classroom teaching in law
schools: first, that learning is informational/theoretical rather than contextual/
experiential; second, that learning should be controlled and relatively self less or
disinterested rather than self-directed, identity-focused, and self-actualizing; and
third, that learning is solitary rather than social. In Part II, I will address each of
these misapprehensions in order, identifying related misconceptions in the process.
Part II will also recapitulate my theory of ecological learning and the search for
practice-based competencies.
Part III explores critical perspectives on practice-based learning starting with
concerns about the satisficing lessons of practice and the sub-standard guidance of
certain workplace supervisors—a danger of all-too-easy fitting in that I call “co-op”tation.
Part III also reviews and challenges over-wrought claims about the superiority of clinical
and classroom based pedagogies of critical reflexivity, though it still proposes that the
typical subconscious and conscious cognitive habits of reflecting on practice during
practice should be supplemented with school-based opportunities to reflect upon and
critique the students’ experiences with the legal system and the forms of legal practice to
which they have been exposed. Part IV concludes with a call to action for legal educators.
We have an ethical, moral, and educational duty to encourage our students to maintain
a critical perspective on their process of acculturation before, during, and after their
practice-based experiences. We should help them explore forms of accommodation and
resistance to legal practice that nurture their commitment to progressive law reform and
their ability to engage constructively in needed social change.
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II.	A THEORY OF ECOLOGICAL LEARNING: EMPHASIZNG PRACTICE

A. Three Misconceptions About Learning: Why Co-Locate Learning in Practice?

Pursuant to the first major misconception, teaching in the classroom is based on
the assumption that humans’ highest cognitive attainment is their ability to assimilate
abstract knowledge and to think propositionally to apply that knowledge in the real
world. The more knowledge you absorb and the more abstract that knowledge is, the
better prepared students are to confront real life problems in the future. However,
human cognition is primarily contextual or situational rather than abstract or theorybased. Humans do not confront a particular place and time, a local field of action,
with a predetermined set of responses, with a theory that unproblematically tells
them how to proceed. Although their responses are funded by the past—by their
cultures of origin, by expectancies drawn from prior experiences, by intuited patterns
and fully formed theories, and by processes of script, analogy, and metaphor—
situational responses are also constituted by the present, the people, tools, and
institutional arrangements that structure a context, that literally generate or call forth
a response. In particular, when confronted with a novel problem, the human mind
does not ordinarily respond by picking the appropriate theory off the shelf. Instead,
the primary resources humans bring to bear are exemplars of past practice—memories
of comparable dilemmas solved poorly or well. These exemplars are typically derived
from practice only secondarily from classroom investigations, and then only if
anchored in authentic, if virtual, dilemmas.
In addition to misapprehending the cognitive resources constructed as memory,
there are several other ways in which the typical knowledge-based pedagogy of the
classroom misrepresents cognitive realities. First, most classroom pedagogy is
ploddingly textual and logical, emphasizing the primacy of conscious thought and
abstract legal doctrine. However, the studies of contextualist cognitivists emphasize
the predominance, simultaneity, and holism of subconscious processes. 2 Cognition
springs forth from multiple subconscious wells; it is certainly more spontaneous than
planned. Second, classical classroom pedagogy is organized around an ethic of
objectivity, even disengagement, or perhaps more accurately positional agnosticism.
Learning is purer if it is unencumbered by representational responsibilities or normative
commitments. Contextualist cognition, on the other hand, recognizes the synergies of
functional engagement, of being deeply involved in a real or virtually real activity.3
Third, classroom pedagogy, particularly for beginners, is often organized around
simplicity, around a building-block theory of intelligence (why otherwise would we
have students read a steady stream of common law cases over and over and over
again?). However, recent cognitive studies reveal that complexity elicits a far more
robust cognitive response.4 In particular it elicits a form of cognitive multiplicity that
is far more resourceful and solution-oriented. Fourth, classroom pedagogy is geared
2.

See Baker, Beyond MacCrate, supra note 1, at 299–302 and sources cited.

3.

Id. at 305–06.

4.

Id. at 314 n.108.
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towards unifying explanations and understandings—a grand theory of one kind or
another, often the one favored by the instructor even if it is a post-modernist antitheory. Contextualist cognition in contrast is pluralistic both in the pragmatism of the
cognitive resources it considers and in the babble of solutions it weighs.5
Just as there is confusion in the classroom about the processes of human cognition,
there is confusion about the presumed limits of experience. One reason experience is
devalued in the classroom is that it is considered to be particularistic, unexamined,
and deformed by subjectivity. However, there are features of experience that make it
more or less useful to learning, e.g., continuity (connectedness with past experience),
interactiveness (the intensity of engagement), staging (working within the zone of
proximal development), repetition and variety (opportunities for both familiar and
plural experience), and finally value (the internal and external signals that make the
experience “worth it”).
The second major assumption of the classroom pedagogy is that educators need
to control learning because of their greater expertise and that students should be kept
in a relatively dependent and suspended social status, as a student, in order for them
to gain cultural literacy. Thus, the classroom regime, from a student’s perspective, is
primarily one of assigned readings, teacher-dictated assignments, and passive
observation of professorial performance in the classroom.6 In contrast, we should
look at students as people with motivational desires and developmental tasks, as
people who want to discard the restrictive and passive roles of the classroom for the
more autonomous, more career and service-focused, and more self-actualizing and
rewarding roles of adulthood. In particular, students want some freedom to decide—
some goal-setting of their own, some exploratory opportunities that they have
selected. It is not just that they want to be free from the classroom (though there is
some of that); they want choice about the collectives they join, the activities they
undertake, and the people they associate with.
Part of that freedom entails freedom to explore a new social identity—an identity
that is necessarily forged in a field of practice.7 Students can develop imaginary identities
about what it might mean to be a nurse or a lawyer or a manager based on cultural
messages, but their personal sense of what it means for them to be a certain kind of
professional, a certain kind of worker, or a certain kind of social activist, can only be
learned by engaging authentically in that role and being exposed to the lived identities
of other co-participants. Thus, students look forward to co-ops, clinical placements,
externships, and even part-time legal work as ways to investigate and confirm, or
sometimes to reject, a new way of life, a new cohort of colleagues, and a new sense of
self and of social identity. From their exposure to others, students experience an array of

5.

Id. at 306–10 and sources cited.

6.

These roles are admittedly expanded and improved when students are asked to construct meaning—as
in “hard” research and writing assignments or when they are engaged in rich legal simulations or
engaging clinical practices.

7.

Etienne Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity 143–221 (1998).
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possible life trajectories for themselves,8 some paradigmatic but others iconoclastic. In
the classroom, students are ordinarily limited to being students, but in legal internships
or in a co-op they can be apprentice trial lawyers, regulators, lobbyists, and judges. They
can begin to align themselves to norms and modes of practice, for better or worse.9
Despite praising practice-based settings as a site of identity formation and selfrealization, it is important to remember that some students, particularly women,
students of color, and gay and lesbian students, might experience workplace
discrimination and alienation, thereby producing fractured identities in the workplace.
In addition to external constraints, students also experience internal constraints on
their participation, and thus their sense of self, because of their lack of confidence or
reluctance to fully engage. However, there is reason to imagine that the classroom
imposes its own analogous outsider regimes and internal senses of alienation.10
The third major misconception of current classroom practice is its presumption
that learning is lonely—that students need to read, research, and write largely on
their own. Because, in this view, learning is dependent on what a student ends up
with in his or her head, individual knowledge is privileged under what Lave calls a
“culture of acquisition.”11 Social practice theory extends the student out of her head
and beyond herself, to emphasize the social content of learning, the interpersonal
ecology of practice. In this interpersonal ecology, the student learns laterally through
collaborative interaction with an entire array of workers and peers and vertically
through the central, fluid dyad involving the supervisor/expert and the student/
novice. Through the metaphor of guided participation, we can explore the elaborate
web of interpersonal relationships that compose the workplace, a social field rich
with connection and interdependency. Within this interpersonal ecology, the
practice-based student and her coworkers enact multiple and evolving relationships
and interactions including role-modeling and emulation, collaboration and mentoring,
and supervision and feedback. Most importantly, however, is the idea of guided
participation, working shoulder-to-shoulder on a common project.
By focusing on guided participation, we see that learning is social and
performative. We see that learners learn not by receiving pre-digested wisdom but by
moving performatively from the fringes of a practice community to its core. This
trajectory of performance and membership is aided by a complex network of
institutional arrangements, human resources, practice routines, coordinated action,
tools, and shoptalk. Thus, students can perform competently in practice because
most practice is structured to facilitate their participation and to provide them
guidance and support, implicitly and explicitly, as they are needed, most especially
8.

Id. at 156.

9.

Id. at 158–81.

10.

See Brook K. Baker, Language Acculturation Processes and Resistance to In“ doctrine”ation in the Legal Skills
Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary on Mertz’s Critical Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom,
34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 131, 157 (2000).

11.

See Jean Lave, The Culture of Acquisition and the Practice of Understanding, in Situation Cognition:
Social, Semiotic, and Psychological Perspectives 17, 18 (David Kirshner & James A. Whitson
eds., 1988).
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during performance itself. Joint performance with more senior practitioners and with
workplace peers facilitates the communication of an elaborate system of performance
clues, feedback signals, and explicit and implicit messages of support and guidance
that help calibrate the student’s fledgling performance. Although newcomers may
start with peripheral and less complex tasks, as they become more familiar with ways
of being and ways of doing, they are given more and more responsibility. As they
learn to fit in, as the value of their work increases, novices are usually given more
complex undertakings. These more complex undertakings in turn increase novices’
familiarity with the multiple dimensions of the domain and gives them increased
opportunities to confront their naïve approaches with more genuine understandings.
When educators think about learning, they tend to overvalue the role of theory
before the fact and the role of reflection after the fact, both of which are ordinarily
controlled by the educator. They do so based on misunderstandings about both theory
and reflection. First, contrary to prevailing assumptions about the ease of remembering
and applying theory, people can rarely recall, let alone articulate, an applicable theory
in advance of contextual experience because the immediate context and the imminent
experience both elicit and interactively reconfigure all cognitive resources, including
theory. Memory is not a filing system—it is a mutating resource that may or may not
materialize to guide the present depending on contextual exigencies. Second, reflection
after the fact is quite likely to be substantially inaccurate because of the relative
inscrutability of conscious thought and the complete invisibility of preconscious and
tacit processes. We simply cannot honestly report on the vast majority of our actual
cognitive processes. Third, rather than rely on theory to problem solve, there is a
strong cognitive preference for reasoning by pattern and exemplar. Patterns emerge
pre-reflexively from repeat experiences. Likewise, exemplars of and from practice
model possible approaches both positively and negatively and thus are the prime
ingredients of actual problem-solving in a domain. Fourth, the most important
location of cognition, including the pragmatic deployment of reflection and theory, is
in action, when the learner is fully engaged, when learners might use intuited patterns,
exemplars of practice, and improvisational theory/themes as world-making resources
to address destabilizing dilemmas. This is why it is so important to locate guidance in
action during the time when the learner is most willing to utilize all available resources,
theory and reflection included, to resolve a real puzzle.
Despite extolling the virtues of practice, I do not mean to suggest that the classroom
fails to add to the student’s cognitive and participatory resources. Expert theory and
reflection can help novices in at least four ways: (1) it can map the cognitive, affective,
and performative dimensions of the expert domain, (2) it can describe expert heuristics
and metacognitive skills, (3) it can facilitate the transfer of otherwise context-bound
skills from one setting or problem to another, and (4) it can introduce the discourse
practices of the domain so that the novice may communicate meaningfully with others.
Similarly, theory and reflection can help to thematize patterns in experience and they
can become usefully encapsulated within reflectively enhanced, practice exemplars.
Finally, conscious theory-and-reflection-in-action can to some extent countermand
subconscious processes and map more expert heuristics over less efficient, “naïve”
625
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cognitive strategies; it can also challenge political and social norms and unethical
cultural demands, thereby potentiating resistance and transformation. But, in none of
these instances does theory and reflection overpower the primacy of subconscious
processes, the evocative power of context, and the centrality of experience itself. Thus,
even though I agree that critical reflection about the law, legal norms, and legal culture
is important in the classroom, before and after practice-based experience, in my view it
is more important that it is nurtured in practice. I will return to this theme in the last
section of this article, which addresses the dangers of “co-op”tation.
B. Achieving Practice-Based Competence

As argued above, placing learning in practice encourages students to enter a
participatory and cognitive apprenticeship with senior practitioners where they can
collaborate to resolve authentic dilemmas and while they can reconceptualize the
workplace as an organic place of learning.12 Contextualizing learning in the workplace
also permits the development of relational skills and situation assessment skills that
thereafter permit the adaptation, transfer, and deployment of performance competencies
to new and unfamiliar tasks. The end result of repeat experience in the field of practice
is a full repertoire of collaborative skill enablements called competence13—capacities to
investigate, think, and act appropriately by oneself and with others.14 The path to
practical competence and domain expertise rests ultimately on increasingly flexible and
coordinated forms of participation15 and on the repeated confrontation of naïve
heuristics with the more genuine understandings of the domain. Although virtually
everyone recommends a confrontation between naïve and expert heuristics in the
classroom, the evolving, evocative ecology of practice may be preferable to the
decontextualized, intellectualized order of the classroom,16 even in the most challenging
disciplinary settings such as law.17 “The surprising thing is that, as a world culture, we
12.

See John S. Brown et al., Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning, 18 Educ. Researcher 32, 39
(1989); Jean Lave, The Practice of Learning, in Understanding Practice: Perspectives on Activity
and Context 3, 5–6 (Seth Chaiklin & Jean Lave eds., 1993) (“It is difficult, when looking closely at
everyday activity . . . to avoid the conclusion that learning is ubiquitous in ongoing activity, though often
unrecognized as such. . . . We have come to the conclusion . . . that there is no such thing as ‘learning’
sui generis, but only changing participation in the culturally designed settings of everyday life.”).

13.

See Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 527, 530 (1994)
(“The foundations for the qualities necessary to the lawyer’s craft lie in character traits and deep
knowledge that one would not characterize as ‘skills’ at all—personal integrity, an inner moral compass,
and a perception of one’s work as embedded in broad social, economic, political, historical, and for
some, spiritual contexts.”).

14.

See Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of
Theory, 45 J. Legal Educ. 313, 358–60 (1995).

15.

See id. at 386–89; Lave & Wenger, supra note 1, at 20 (“[T]he skillful learner acquires something more
like the ability to play various roles in various fields of participation.”).

16.

See Gardner, supra note 1, at 179.

17.

Id. at 123–24 (“Even in the most advanced industrialized countries, certain trades and professions are
best learned by working alongside a master, observing what he does, and passing through a graded set of
challenges and opportunities. . . . Many vocations and avocations . . . are profitably approached through
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have sensed part of the answer [to cultivating genuine understanding] all along. The
kinds of environments called apprenticeships have for millennia fused the available
forms of knowing in a rich and contextualized way.”18
To achieve practice-based competence, students must develop a set of skills that
differ in important ways from traditional conceptions of instrumentalist skills carried
unproblematically from one context to another. Relational skills, situation skills, gapclosing skills,19 and transfer skills all emerge in the context of guided problem-solving
activities; these skills are learned best through repeated collaborative experience—
through more and more social practice. “Quite simply, if learning is about increased
access to performance, then the way to maximize learning is to perform, not to talk
apprenticeship techniques. . . . And revealingly, some of the most demanding pursuits in the society,
from graduate study at the university to medical internships to the role of a senior aide in a political or
business environment, amount to apprenticeship arrangements”); cf. Stephen F. Hamilton,
Apprenticeship for Adulthood: Preparing Youth for the Future (1990) (recommending an
expanded system of apprenticeship primarily for non-college bound students).
18.

Gardner, supra note 1, at 181. Gardner proceeds to catalogue the multiple reasons why apprenticeships
are such powerful contexts for learning.
Why do apprenticeships work effectively? . . . They provide rich information, nearly all
of which pertains in some readily recognizable way to final performances and products
of demonstrable importance within a society. They permit aspiring youngsters to work
directly alongside accomplished professionals, hence establishing personal bonds . . . .
Frequently they also feature interim steps of accomplishment . . . . Peers and others of
slightly differing competences can often help and instruct one another. Apprenticeships
often are highly motivating; youngsters enter directly into the excitement that surrounds
an important, complex, and sometimes mysterious undertaking, where the stakes for
success (and the costs of failure) may be high. Finally, apprenticeships embody centuries
of lore about how best to accomplish the task at hand, and this lore can be invoked or
exemplified at the precise moment when it is needed, rather than at some arbitrary
location in a lecture, text, or syllabus.

Id. at 124. Gardner’s account of the strengths of apprenticeships is remarkably similar to that of my
colleague Michael Meltsner.
When lawyers learned their trade in the law office, the gap between theory and practice
was smaller than it is today. The new lawyer’s training was not sequential but
simultaneous and thus doctrine and desire, money and ethics, words and music, had to
be sorted, balanced and resolved in a single process of professional commitment. The
perspective of clients was part of the very fabric of discovering and analyzing doctrine.
The neophyte received prompt feedback about his performance from the environment
in which he worked. Lessons in human relations, fact gathering, interviewing,
counseling and negotiation, in blood and guts if you will, were among the first rather
than the last learned by the new practitioner and they were learned when the young
lawyer was on the line. A result of the shift to academic preparation is that young
lawyers and their seniors lost the apprentice-master relationship that was the key to the
way law was learned in the law office.

Michael Meltsner, Healing the Breach: Harmonizing Legal Practice and Education, 11 Vt. L. Rev. 377,
384–85 (1986).
19.

See J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 35, 45
(1994) (discussing the role of writing as a gap-closing procedure, a cognitive process of investigation and
discovery, as well as a way to communicate intended meaning. They note that “writing is an integral
part of thinking and cognitive development.”).
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about it.” 20 Thus, a pedagogy that empowers our students to develop genuine
understandings must be primarily contextual rather than didactic and prescriptive.
Rather than instruction, there is conversation, guidance, and feedback—forms of
social support that draw the novice into more meaningful and effective participation
in the full range of activities within a social practice domain.21
Although there are clearly skeptics of apprentice-like approaches, even friendly
skeptics who urge the utilization of more educator-centric practicums, 22 it is
nonetheless crucial to examine the evolution of practice-based competence since so
many university students work with practitioners who are not educational specialists
on co-ops, in internships, in community service learning, and in clinical placements.
In exploring the cognitive and performative foundations of competence, what might
be called ecological skills, four points are worth emphasizing: (1) learning disciplinary
skills is more a matter of enculturation than of cognitive development; thus
contextualizing learning in the workplace permits both a cognitive apprenticeship
and a life-long perspective on work as a learning opportunity; (2) recognizing skills
to be relational, interactive, and contingent permits us to focus more on the entire
social network rather than on any single strand of relationships; (3) learning in the
workplace helps develop situation-assessment skills as well as performance and
transfer skills; and (4) learning in the workplace promotes confrontation of ineffective
heuristics and their replacement with genuine understandings.
		

1.	Learning as Enculturation—Contextualizing Skills Development in the
Workplace

Rather than being conceived as the acquisition of abstract knowledge, learning is
best conceived as a process of enculturation.23
Expertise does not exist in a vacuum; it is a social construct. The concept of
expertise cannot exist independently of a community of knowledge. The
knowledge about which one is considered by others to be expert is developed,
defined, evaluated, maintained, and transmitted by those in the community
who are qualified to make judgments about what counts as expertise. If that
is so, then we acquire expertise not in a vacuum, but as novices who must be
socialized into a community of knowledge. . . . The process of becoming an
expert is at least as much a social process as an exercise of individual effort
and intellect. Put this way, expert thinking is successful socialization. 24

20. Lave & Wenger, supra note 1, at 22; see Brest & Krieger, supra note 13, at 559 (“Perhaps even more

than most skills, problem solving and judgment are developed largely through trial and error in practice.
Such is the case with any art, craft, or profession.”). See generally Lave, supra note 1.

21.

See Gardner, supra note 1, at 21; Lave & Wenger, supra note 1, at 109.

22.

See Schön, Educating the Reflective Practitioner, supra note 1, at 37, 157–73 (urging studiolike practicums as an intermediate “virtual reality”).

23.

Brown et al., supra note 12, at 33–34.

24.

Joseph M. Williams, On the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and Development, 1 J.
Legal Writing Inst. 1, 13 (1991).
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If it is true that learning is based on enculturation, then it makes sense to ask how long
one must stay in an educational waiting room. Although we might agree that university
is an important, perhaps even essential step in learning certain forms of analysis, there is
no compelling defense of the academy’s claim to be the primary locus of learning. Any
reasonable view of education/enculturation would permit, indeed encourage, exposure
to other actors besides professors and to social participations and activities other than
reading books, sitting in classrooms, and working in educator-dominated laboratories.
In addition to fostering enculturation, practice-based opportunities also permit
learning to be contextualized. Ample evidence shows that most skills development is
contextual and interpersonal—that learning skills occurs as a result of transactions
with one’s environment, as a result of interactions with a myriad others in that
environment, and as a result of adaptation to contextual circumstances.25
Knowledge—perhaps better called knowing—is not an invariant property of
an individual, something that he or she has in any situation. Instead, knowing
is a property that is relative to situations, an ability to interact with things and
other people in various ways. . . . In the view of situated cognition, we need to
characterize knowing, reasoning, understanding, and so on as relations
between cognitive agents and situations . . . . 26

These situational opportunities are highly motivational 27 precisely because they occur

25.

See Lave & Wenger, supra note 1; James G. Greeno et al., Transfer of Situated Learning, in Transfer
on Trial: Intelligence, Cognition, and Instruction 99 (Douglas K. Detterman & Robert J.
Sternberg eds., 1993); Rogoff, supra note 1; Lave, supra note 12; Brown et al., supra note 12.

26. Greeno et al., supra note 25, at 99–100.
27.

According to Gardner and others, one of the most fundamental advantages of contextual placement in the
“real world” of doing valued work is motivational—its ability to engage and harness the learner’s intentions.
See Gardner, supra note 1, at 124. There is little doubt that motivation greatly enhances the learning
process. Peter Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory Process, 1982 Ariz. St. L.J. 277, 287
(“The assumption of responsibility for another’s welfare, the novelty of the situation, the scrutiny of the
teacher, clients, judges, and lawyers, and the perception that the students’ success in the clinic directly
reflects on future professional success all contribute to . . . a ‘need to know.’”); Marc Stickgold, Exploring
the Invisible Curriculum: Clinical Field Work in American Law Schools, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 287, 315 (1989)
(“Many law students appear motivated to do their best in a real law office. There is, indeed, a difference
between ‘hothouse’ growth, and growth in a real world environment.”); see also Janet Motley, Self-Directed
Learning and the Out-of-House Placement, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 211, 222–24 (1989); see Stephen Maher, The
Praise of Folly: A Defense of Practice Supervision in Clinical Legal Education, 69 Neb. L. Rev. 537, 596 n.194
(1990) (“[f]rom the students’ point of view, field experience serves as yardstick, laboratory, escape, gapfiller, career compass, and, most importantly, as the means by which they are able to become active in
relation to their own learning and educational development.” (quoting D. Schön, Field Experience and
Professional Education in M.I.T.’s School of Architecture and Planning 53–54 (1974))). Not
only do students want to escape the constraints of intellectualizing about a system they have not yet
experienced, they also want to put on grownup clothes and reverse the infantilization that so many students
undergo in school. Id. at 563 n.83 (“Although they cater to academically gifted students, law schools do
not treat most students as adults. Faculty, with varying degrees of intensity, view many students as ignorant,
unmotivated, insincere, selfish, materialistic, and unwilling and unable to take greater responsibility for
their professional growth and development.” (quoting Steven D. Pepe, Clinical Legal Education: Is Taking
Rites Seriously a Fantasy, Folly, or Failure?, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 307, 323 (1985))).
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in the organic swampland of practice. 28 “[T]he reasons for the various procedures
being taught are generally evident, because the master is in the process of producing
goods or services for which there exist an explicit demand and an evident use.”29
Other theorists agree that knowledge and skill development are enhanced by a
contextualized learning environment which: (1) accommodates the constructive
nature of learning; (2) integrates the acquisition of domain-specific knowledge and
more general and thus transferable cognitive skills; (3) takes into account individual
differences in knowledge, intention, ability, and approaches between learners; and (4)
embeds learning in realistic contexts involving functional activities and interactions
with others. 30 These conditions combine to create an authentic, “cognitive
apprenticeship” where perception, performance, and thought coalesce. 31 These
conditions also foster a student’s appreciation of the learning potential in the
workplace.32 Rather than see work as a place of drudgery or routine performance,
28. See Schön, Educating the Reflective Practitioner, supra note 1, at 3.
29. Gardner, supra note 1, at 122.
30. See Lave, supra note 1, at 41–43; Erik De Corte, Fostering the Acquisition and Transfer of Intellectual

Skills, in Learning Across the Lifespan 95, 96 (Albert Tuijnman & Max van der Kamp eds., 1992)
(“[R]ecent research points to the need to anchor learning in more realistic and authentic situations.”).
This movement towards contextualized learning and cognitive apprenticeships coincides with a
historical shift, especially in Europe, of centering more life-long learning in the workplace. See generally
Hamilton, supra note 17 (discussing German efforts in particular); Albert C. Tuijnman, Paradigm
Shifts in Adult Education, in Learning Across the Lifespan, supra at 205, 209 (this shift has been
occasioned in part by influential studies “which on the whole seem to indicate that the private rates of
return to training [on the job] tend to be very high compared with the rate of return to formal schooling
. . . .” (citing Market Failure in Training: New Economic Analysis and Evidence on Training
of Adult Employees (D. Stern & J.M.M. Ritzen eds., 1991))). It is not obvious that these studies of
European educational and work-training systems can be directly compared to an analysis of legal
education in the United States.

31.

Brown et al., supra note 12 (urging cognitive apprenticeships, embedding learning in authentic activity
that makes use of the social and physical context). “[T]he term apprenticeship helps to emphasize the
centrality of activity in learning and knowledge and highlights the inherently context dependent,
situational, and enculturing nature of learning.” Id. at 39.
The recently introduced situated cognition paradigm stresses precisely the importance
of contextualized learning, and puts forward the ‘cognitive apprenticeship’ view of
learning and instruction as an approach embracing the basic characteristics of situated
acquisition of knowledge and skills. . . . Cognitive apprenticeship methods try to
enculturate students into authentic practices through activity and social interaction in a
way similar to that evident - and evidently successful - in craft apprenticeship. In other
words, constructive learning processes should be embedded in contexts that are rich in
resources and learning materials, that offer opportunities for social interaction, and that
are representative of the kinds of tasks and problems to which the learners will have to
apply their knowledge and skill in future.

De Corte, supra note 30, at 96–97.
32.

See Mechthild U. Hart, Working and Educating for Life: Feminist and International
Perspectives on Adult Education (1992).
Looking at work from the perspective of its learning potential is fundamentally different
from looking at it simply in terms of skills needed in order to perform well on the job.
The latter view reduces work from a rich, multi-layered experience to a one-dimensional

630

VOLUME 56 | 2011/12

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

recognizing the learning potential of work empowers the learner to take a life-long
perspective on continuing to develop expertise.
		

2. A Relational Theory of Skills

Expanding on earlier “dimensional” views of power and drawing on his own
maturing philosophy of social constructionism, Steven Winter has proposed a fourdimensional view of power. 33 In doing so, he articulates a dynamic of reciprocal
social relationships that is equally adaptable to other interpersonal and social
phenomenon, even to the concept of skills. This four-dimensional view radically
restructures our thinking about the nature of skills, their sources and routines. In
particular, this view challenges the instrumentalist conception of readily transferable
skill modules, e.g., the interviewing, counseling, negotiation, and fact investigation
skills of lawyers. It also challenges the standard conception of a powerful autonomous
professional who imposes his abilities and skills on a compliant social universe.
In Winter’s view, power is not a thing, a possession, a capacity, or even an inherently
hierarchical structure. Power is not a personal capacity amassed and possessed by an
individual, let alone a force unilaterally imposed as a matter of applied agency upon
compliant and subservient others. Instead, power is relational; it is a distributed social
phenomenon that emerges from continuous and pervasive social interdependencies,
means-ends relationship between worker and skills, where workers need to acquire
certain skills in order to become employable and to contribute to an increase in
productivity.

Id. at 12. See generally Victoria J. Marsick & Karen E. Watkins, Informal and Incidental
Learning in the Workplace (1990); Development in the Workplace (Jack Demick & Patrice
M. Miller eds., 1993).
33.

See Steven L. Winter, The “Power” Thing, 82 Va. L. Rev. 721 (1996). I have previously used Winter’s
power theory in another context to discuss a transformative ethic of client empowerment; this section
borrows heavily on that previous analysis. See Brook K. Baker, Traditional Issues of Professional
Responsibility and a Transformative Ethic of Client Empowerment for Legal Discourse, 34 New Eng. L.
Rev. 809, 867–73 (2000). According to Winter, the four different “dimensional” metaphors of power
might be summarized as follows:
One-dimensional view: A has power over B to the extent A can get B to do something
that B would not otherwise do.
Two-dimensional view: A not only gets to exert power vis-à-vis contested issues, but
also gets to set the agenda by insuring inaction on issues otherwise important to B.

Three-dimensional view: A may exercise control not only vis-à-vis contested issues and
by setting the agenda, but by affecting, influencing, shaping, or determining B’s very
wants and desires. Under this view, the sheer weight of institutional practices and social
norms structures peoples’ experience and interpretations of the world.

Four-dimensional view: “Power is a machine in which everyone is caught, those who
exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised.”

Winter, supra at 799-800 (quoting Michel Foucault, The Eye of Power, in Power/Knowledge 146, 156
(1980)); see id. at 868 n.220 (citing Winter, The “Power” Thing, 82 Va. L. Rev. 721, 764–65 (1996)). Power
can only be understood as the product of a dynamic system, one that is both historically grounded but
contingent and mutable as well. See Steven L. Winter, The “Power” Thing, 82 Va. L. Rev. 721, 799–800
(1996).
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social processes, and institutional arrangements.34 Thus, according to Winter, power
“is a contingent product of common ways of understanding and living in a social world,
a function of reciprocally enacted roles, routines, institutions and understandings.”35 In
this sense, power “is not so much a capacity owned as a process shared.”36 “In principle,
then, power is always open to challenge and renegotiation. Because the role must be
personified in each and every case, each enactment is also a potential reconstruction.”37
Fundamentally, according to Winter, “power is an interpretive institution. Like all social
institutions, it exists only so long as the actors who constitute it continue to reproduce
their respective roles and routines.”38
In the interpersonal ecology of practice, skills, abilities, competencies, or
enablements—whatever you want to call the effective performances of a social practice
domain—are likewise emergent social phenomena. To be most useful, these terms
should connote the interactive, highly social ability to operate within and to influence
relationships, understandings, and events within an institutional or practice context.
Rather than thinking of these skills as self-sponsored and univalent, however, we should
understand that all of our performances are essentially reciprocal. Lawyers cannot
“interview” a “client” unless another human joins them in a particular social relationship
whereby legal knowledge and expertise is somehow enlisted on that person’s behalf and
unless that person constructs and reveals facts, attitudes, and interpretations about his or
her life events in a way that permits the lawyer to structure a legally coherent account.
For example, if a person came to a law office and started into a long description of her
family squabbles and then began to dictate a letter about a particular grievance her
mother had with her sister, we would clearly doubt whether we were in a legal interview.
For a lawyer to be skillful, both the attorney and the client must adopt familiar roles.
Furthermore, they must adopt a particular family of communicative strategies to have
anything that we might meaningfully describe as a legal interview.
Dangling within and constituted by a particular subset of relational roles and
engaging in particular kinds of communicative practices and social acts, disciplinary
experts attempt to subtly rearrange the social world in desirable ways—but can do so
only with the joint participation and cooperation of other social actors. These efforts
and the efficacy of their performances are frequently called skills, but they are much
more fruitfully considered collaborative enterprises. People respond individually, and
institutions39 respond collectively, as a result of their reciprocal sensitivity and
34. Winter, supra note 33, at 728. “Power is not a property of an actor who exercises domination over

another; it is the emergent quality of a reciprocal social relation. Just as its assertion enacts power,
deference can generate or sustain it.” Id. at 741.

35.

Id. at 742.

36. Id. at 799.
37.

Id. at 810.

38. Id. at 831.
39.

“[A]n institution is nothing more (or less) than the practices, reward structure, and attendant processes
of socialization that successfully reproduce a set of roles, values, and routines in an ever-changing group
of people who constitute the institution’s ‘personnel.’” Id. at 775.
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agreement, tacit and explicit, with the vibration of the web that they have initiated
together. These responses are rarely singular—act begets act. Instead, a series of
gestures, moves, and words elicit contingent social responses, which in turn subtly
change the field of exchange. Provisional plans mutate, new tactics spring forth, and
in the process socially meaningful ends might (or might not) emerge from the social/
relational field. If dependents, adversaries, and decision makers all interact according
to socially meaningful ends, in a way that is pleasing, we are said to have been skillful
or competent or to have had ability. And yet, this attribution of a unilateral and one
dimensional agency and efficacy clearly misrepresents that which has been a
profoundly contingent, variable, and interpretive process and even more so
misrepresents that which has been irreducibly interactive. Such an individualistic
formulation also over-privileges planning, prediction, intention, and control40 at the
expense of contextual awareness, interpersonal sensitivity, creativity, and reciprocity.
There may be much cognitive and emotional work that precedes a certain vibration
in the web, but the ultimate effective act is a shared, social one arising from a
particular cultural context and from within a continuum of historical interactions. 41
		

3.	Fostering Situation Skills, Skill Enablements, and Transfer Skills as the Route
to Practical Competence

Contextualizing skills as an outcome of enculturation and recognizing the social/
relational roots of skills highlights the importance of situation assessment skills
which are necessary precursors to the deployment of task performance skills. Only by
immersion in a functional context can a novice appreciate, develop, and utilize
situation skills at the same time she emulates the conventional performance skills of
practitioners. The combination of the two kinds of skills eventually leads to a state of
enablement called practical competence wherein skills learned in one context or one
type of complex problem are adaptable and transferable resources for exploring
analogous problems in less familiar contexts.
Rather than seeing performance skills as abstract, decontextualized, readily
transferable, instrumentalist recipes, it would be better to see the relationship between
general capacities to act and the specific contexts or situations where those competencies
might be enacted. “Activity psychology and modern cognitive theory stress that skills
should be analyzed as competences or ‘capacities to act,’ and that these competences
are ‘situated.’”42 This knowing is not primarily cognitive in the sense of a formal,
40. “[A]ny intentions developed during the course of an established activity or role are, in an important

sense, prescripted by the purposes and possibilities that constitute that particular endeavor as an
endeavor.” Id. at 811.

41.

“Because efficacy and effect are contingent on a variety of contextual factors both internal and external . . .
the strategy that emerges may be very different than the calculated tactic that gave it birth.” Id. at 812.

42.

Jeroen Onstenk, Skills Needed in the Workplace, in Learning Across the Lifespan, supra note 30, at
137, 140 (citations omitted). For example, using thinking-aloud protocols, Linda Flower and John
Hayes have shown how expert writers continue to develop and transform their understanding of a
writing dilemma and their rhetorical strategies throughout a multi-stage writing process. Linda Flower
& John R. Hayes, The Cognition of Discovery: Defining a Rhetorical Problem, 31 C. Composition &
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reified mental representation carried unproblematically from one situation to another.43
Instead, situational knowing, in law and in other forms of practice, is predominately
social and as such it is distributed between and among the joint participants in a social
practice setting.44 Accordingly, to deploy skills in a practice setting involves more than
expert knowledge about conventions of practice, it requires the ability to react to and
utilize the resources and constraints of a particular environment; it requires situational
skills. Because “[e]ach task and work environment is characterized by a degree,
however small, of uncertainty, uniqueness or conflict” and because of the uncertainties
and situational constraints of interpersonal relations and organizational norms, people
need to develop situational competencies as well as technical proficiencies.45 These
situational competencies include both strategic effectiveness in obtaining results in a
field of constraint and opportunity, and social/communication skills in dealing with,
learning from, and cooperating with others.46
One of the consequences of domain specificity and of the situational anchoring
of knowledge is recognition of the difficulty in transferring or applying skills and
knowledge from one context to another.47 Most investigators believe that expertise is
inbred rather than hybrid, and that it is difficult to transfer or adapt expert thinking
over long “distances.”48 “Thinking at its most effective depends on specific, contextbased skills and units of knowledge that have little application to other domains. To
the extent that transfer does take place, it is highly specific and must be cued, primed,
and guided; it seldom occurs spontaneously.”49
Comm. 21 (1980), reprinted in The Writing Teacher’s Sourcebook 92 (Gary Tate & Edward P.J.
Corbett eds., 2d ed. 1988).
43.

Lave, supra note 1, at 23–44, 142, 175. Rideout and Ramsfield have the same understanding about legal
writing skills. “Legal writing, in this view, is not a unitary, idealized, universalized practice, but rather
one that shifts with the topic, [purpose,] or audience, and also with the setting.” Rideout & Ramsfield,
supra note 19, at 97.

44. William F. Hanks, Foreword, in Lave & Wenger, supra note 1, at 13, 17.
45.

Onstenk, supra note 42, at 148.

46. Id.
47.

Baker, Beyond MacCrate, supra note 1, at 318–24.

48. Id. at 321; Williams, supra note 24, at 11.
49. D.N. Perkins & Gavriel Salomon, Are Cognitive Skills Context-Bound?, 18 Educ. Researcher 16, 19

(1989). “[G]eneral cognitive skills can be thought of as general gripping devices for retrieving and
wielding domain-specific knowledge . . . .” Id. at 23. In contrast to this limited-transfer view, other
investigators conclude that expert thinking is in fact a blend of specialized knowledge/skills and more
general cognitive abilities that are routinely adapted to novel settings. See supra note 1. These general
cognitive skills might include: problem decomposition, inferencing, hypothesis generation, end-means
thinking, and planning as well as metacognitive abilities to reflect on and double-check one’s strategies.
Stephen T. Peverly, Problems with Knowledge-Based Explanations of Memory and Development, 61 Rev.
Educ. Res. 71, 83–84 (1991). The availability of these general cognitive skills would suggest that
training for transfer is a relatively easy form of instruction.

		
The practical importance of this debate about degrees of transferability for legal educators is threefold: (1) are the alleged cognitive skills developed in law school significantly more general, accessible,
and transferable than the skill enablements acquired in a practice context; (2) can learners be trained to
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A more radical critique of transfer theory suggests that it is fundamentally flawed
to the extent that it proposes that experience must be or can be systematically abstracted
and that the resulting abstraction is routinely accessible, adaptable, and employable in
confronting subsequent dilemmas.50 One of the flaws in transfer theory is the
assumption that problems are well defined by a problem-giver or even by an expert
problem diagnostician. In practice, diagnosticians, e.g., medical, legal, and math
practitioners, are investigators exploring multiple problem definitions under conditions
of uncertainty and confusion. In other words, dilemmas are explored through
chronological activity and ongoing interpretation. In that process, problems are
discovered, created, recreated, and transformed51 through “gap-closing” procedures and
processes of discovery, exploration, and improvisation52 rather than through abstract
“problem solving” and deployment of standardized instrumental skills. Likewise, goals
are not always “givens” external to the problem being constituted. Instead, goals are
identified and created out of the inherent conflicts of the dilemma.53
Likewise, transfer theory is flawed by the assumption that similarity between
conditions or problems “exist” when in fact human actors “create” or “establish relations
of similarity” through their interpretative processes, their activity within a problem
space, and their collection/deployment of resources. People do not find analogies, they
create them, intuitively and otherwise, by constructing both similarities and
dissimilarities.54
The final problem with transfer theory is the assumption that abstraction or
theory is the principle resource from the past,55 that abstraction can be accomplished
enhance their transfer skills whether those skills are learned in school or in practice, and (3) is that
training, if possible, better done in authentic practice contexts or in school-based learning? The first
question involves one of the longest lasting and most intense debates of modern education—does a
liberal arts education, and its law school counterpart, prepare learners with a predicate set of general
intellectual skills which are routinely remembered and adapted to local conditions as the need arise? As
previously established, the exaggerated claims of the academy about the nature of theoretical knowledge,
its easy transmission, ready accessibility, and routine applicability have all been substantially discredited.
See generally Baker, Beyond MacCrate, supra note 1, at 332–48. As discussed in the following text,
answers to the second and third questions suggest students can learn transfer skills ecologically in a
practice context.
50. See Baker, Beyond MacCrate, supra note 1, at 323–24.
51.

See Lave, supra note 1, at 23–44.

52.

Id. at 142. “Gap-closing processes unite means and ends, transforming both in the process . . . .” Id. at
175.

53.

Id.

54. See Blasi, supra note 14, at 355–61.
55.

The ideology of formal solutions—theory—and the algorithms of formal solutions reverberate in the
discourse activities of a domain. Humans who have been subjected to schooling and to the ideology of
rational thought, reflection, and theory refer back to that ideology when discussing and explaining their
practice. However, rather than being implemented in dilemma resolving activities as such, theory and
formal solutions are much more likely to be used in a required justificatory, i.e., ideological, discourse
within the domain. In other words, practitioners may, through convention or otherwise, speak theory
even though they do not do theory. See Lave, supra note 1, at 176. “An alternative account of the orderly

635

Practice-Based Learning

early and effectively, and that conscious, verbally explicit strategies improve problemsolving. Social practice theory and research confirm that repeated opportunities to
confront and resolve dilemmas are the more effective means of shaping knowledge
and realizing its usages.56 In other words, more practice, not just more talk, is likely
to resolve deficiencies or crises in performance.57 The end result of these reiterative
experiences is not ordinarily a blueprint for future practice,58 but a set of exemplars,
individual and shared,59 which create expectations60 to be enacted, explored, and
transformed under local conditions of constraint, opportunity, and resource. The
repertoire of historical exemplars of practice help create a personal field of action, a

and (un)remarkably effective character of practice may be found in the complex constitution of
structuring resources inventively employed in gap-closing, sense-making processes.” Id.

		
As an example of the justificatory uses of theory and its relative absence in practice, Lave and
Wenger report that “the verbal instruction provided by health officials has the effect of teaching
midwives how to talk in biomedical terms when required. Such talk only serves to give them ‘face
validity’ in the eyes of others who believe in the authoritative character of biomedicine.” Lave &
Wenger, supra note 1, at 107. Ironically, however, this biomedical discourse practice seems to have “no
effect” on midwives’ existing practice. Id.
56. Lave, supra note 1, at 44.
57.

See id. at 182. “Discursive commentaries about experience . . . are [commonly] believed to be necessary
conditions for learning abstract and general notions, but there is an alternative to this view, when direct
experience is taken to be the more basic condition of learning.” Id. at 183. This observation does not suggest
that social discourse cannot prove effective or that guidance from others is illusory. It does mean that the
ultimate test of discourse and guidance is the opportunity for continuing performance in which advice will
be accessed (perhaps) as one additional resource in constituting and resolving the present dilemma.

		
Perhaps parents can relate best to the following example. During the summer vacation, I had
difficulty (again) convincing my teenage son to take out the garbage and to clear the table. The standard
disapproving and exhortatory lectures were not working—in fact they increased resentment on both
sides. A friend ultimately proposed more responsibility, i.e., more activity, instead of more moral
persuasion. She recommended that he make supper rather than merely clean up afterwards. On a few
glorious occasions that advice actually worked.
58. “[I]nformation and skills are not transmitted but are transformed in the process of appropriation [and

use]. Social activity serves not as a template for individual participation but as a stepping stone, guiding
the path taken but not determining it. For as individuals participate in social activity, they choose some
aspects for attention and ignore others, and they transform what is available to fit their uses.” Rogoff,
supra note 1, at 197.

59.

One’s repertoire of exemplars can derive from personal, individualist activity, but much more commonly
it results from shared activity and joint participation. Rogoff proposes “learning” through appropriation
of shared, not just individual, activity rather than internalization of external activity or of distal,
propositional discourse. See id. at 195.

60. There is some degree of regularity of expectations, of social continuity, in historically structured practice

domains, e.g., lawyering. That regularity or continuity ordinarily emerges when repeated activity within
a domain permits one to reproduce similarity from one occasion to another. The resulting legacy of such
activities is central and routine exemplars of activities-in-setting, congruent with canonical exemplars
and the patterned in personal performance, which are given priority confronting current dilemmas.
“Continuity may be thought of as an active production of the reproduction of settings, activities and
selves. It is achieved through change and improvisation, partly subjectively and partly through the
reproduction of the constitutive order.” Lave, supra note 1, at 187.
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set of expectancies which give rise to familiarity, routine, and practical competence—to
adaptable and applicable lessons.
Assuming that transfer of some enablements is an attainable goal, some
investigators are optimistic about the ability to train for transfer, subject to constraints.
“[T]ransfer effects do not occur spontaneously, and are even difficult to obtain
deliberately,” given the importance of well-organized, domain-specific knowledge
and experience.61 Nonetheless, transfer proponents cite growing evidence that the
ability to transfer can be enhanced through the following methods: (1) increasing
metacognitive, or self-monitoring skills; (2) mindful abstraction of skills to be
transferred and purposeful reapplication of those same skills; and (3) partial
decontextualization of the skills through framing and recontextualization through
bridging.62 Metacognitive skills focus on being alert to the possibility of transfer—
being mindful of its possibility and alert for opportunities.63 Mindful abstraction of
skills is aided by using problem-based learning where the heuristics of diagnosis,
information search, and solution are used over and over again and thereafter reflected
upon.64 The prescription for framing or integration is related to the call for mindful
abstraction and involves abstracting one heuristic behavior to a broader problemsolving framework, i.e. recognizing that ends-means thinking can be one form of
planning alternative approaches based on a desired outcome.65 Bridging, on the other
hand, involves consciously drawing connections between processes used in a past
contextual dilemma and similar processes adaptable to the present context.66 Bridging
may have the most universal application since it relies on the cognitive preference of
looking for, creating, and employing analogies.67
The possibility of training for transfer leads to the question of whether transfer
skills, assuming they exist, are learned better in the classroom or in the field. As
described above, most of what might be called transfer skills require the development
of situation sense, a sense that evolves only in practice.68 Likewise, developing transfer
skills requires the opportunity to practice transfer using a particular substrate of
knowledge resources—again, an opportunity best enacted in the context of repeated
authentic dilemmas. Finally, research has consistently shown that it is difficult to
61.

De Corte, supra note 30, at 101.

62. See id. at 102–04. The possibility of mindful abstraction and decontextualization is the most problematic

feature of this theory.

63. David Perkins, Smart Schools: Better Thinking and Learning for Every Child 125 (1992).
64. See id. at 127 (citing John D. Bransford et al., New Approaches to Instruction: Because Wisdom Can’t be Told,

in Similarity and Analogical Reasoning 470 (Stella Vosniadou & Andrew Ortony eds., 1989)).

65.

De Corte, supra note 30, at 104.

66. Id.; see Blasi, supra note 14, at 360–61.
67.

See Perkins, supra note 63, at 125 (citing Ann L. Brown, Analogical Learning and Transfer: What Develops?,
in Similarity and Analogical Reasoning, supra note 64, at 369); Blasi, supra note 14, at 355–61.

68. Onstenk, supra note 42, at 151 (explaining that to be able to transfer skills from one setting to another,

people “need to recognize them [comparable skills], to be able to perform complex processes of
decontextualization and recontextualization, and to be able to respond flexibly”).
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transfer theory from the classroom to the job, “since people depend on cues in their
normal work environment to understand and solve problems.”69 Accordingly, “it is
more natural to start by helping people analyze the context in which they experience
a problem and then to help them look at the solutions they identify in light of [more
abstract] principles which might help them do their work differently.” 70 These
findings do not doom the possibility of learning some transfer skills in the classroom,
but they do strongly suggest that transfer is learned just as well or better in practice
settings, especially when one varies and repeats the setting and the activities.
		

4. Confronting Naïve Understandings with Expert Heuristics

Students developing new skills experience mind-clash, the confrontation between
what they already know and the skills they already have and the situational, cognitive,
and performative requirements of a novel dilemma. Whenever humans confront an
unfamiliar task, our initial impulse it to apply, consciously and unconsciously, the
patterns of thought and repertoire of skills that have worked previously. However,
these previous problem-solving strategies are often situationally inappropriate—they
are the wrong tools for an under defined problem—we reach with them, but the tools
will not grasp. Fortunately, a cognitive apprenticeship is a particularly apt medium
for managing cognitive confrontation between naïve understandings from the past
and the more genuine understandings of the present. These practice-based experiences
build naturally on intuitive childhood or novice understandings even as they confront,
challenge, and modify those intuitions with more expert understandings.
Indeed, apprenticeships may well be the means of instruction that builds most
effectively on the ways in which most young people learn. . . . To the extent
that they feature more formal notations or concepts, these are introduced to
the learner directly in the context in which they are wanted, and the learner
sees for himself the ways in which they may be applied. Here the differences
from formal schooling are most salient. Of course, the learner’s misconceptions
and stereotypes may interfere with mastery, but they are perhaps less likely to
emerge, and more likely to be counterindicated when they do emerge, because
the learner is working closely with a master who may be experienced in
meeting and muting such erroneous beliefs and practices.71

What we call practical competence is the end result of contextualization, relational
skills, situation assessment skills, transfer skills, and cognitive confrontation. Practical
competence is characterized by a combination of a specific domain of knowledge and
a situated repertoire of capacities to act. Practical competence replaces earlier more
naïve and simplistic forms of knowledge and performance with genuine understandings
69. Marsick & Watkins, supra note 32, at 52; Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the

Construction of Competence, 43 J. Legal Educ. 469, 482 (1993) (discussing a study of how beginning
lawyers learned lawyering skills found that “[t]raditional law school classes are not the only, or even the
principal, source for the development of legal skills”).

70. Marsick & Watkins, supra note 32, at 52.
71.

Gardner, supra note 1, at 124.
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and expert heuristics. Practical competence includes the capacity to use the
environment in doing the job: tools and physical environment, other actors
(supervisors, coworkers, clients), conceptual tools and the professional culture itself
contribute to an ability to cope with the key problems of the workplace.72 Practical
competence, therefore, is preferable to any form of purely theory-based competence
because it enables the actual expression of skill enablements in their proper, situated
forms. 73 As repeatedly stressed, this competence can mature only in practice, though
skill enablements can be prefigured and perhaps further enriched by particular forms
of school-based reflection as described further below (Part III).
III. CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE DANGERS OF “CO-OP”TATION

Despite my optimism about practice-based learning and despite the apparent
success of practice-based learning at Northeastern University School of Law and
elsewhere, there are at least three daunting challenges to its maximization. First, if
students are not challenged on the job, not given meaningful responsibilities, and not
socialized as team members—in other words, if they are given mundane or trivial
tasks, if they are asked to perform grunt-work only—then the practice-based
experience may not be worth the tuition dollars and opportunity costs they entail.
Second, to the extent ecological learning is dependent on high quality participation
in a highly competent setting, we must consider the dangers of exposure to
substandard and unethical practice that may lead students to uncritical acceptance of
inferior standards of performance and to amoral acceptance of unethical conduct.
Third, the process of enculturation through participation leads to the danger of
uncritical acculturation—of fitting in all too well. This danger includes unreflective
acquiescence to oppressive institutional arrangements and cultural norms. For me,
72. Id. at 145–49.
73. After cataloguing the many educational advantages of practice-based learning, Gardner’s final argument

for contextualized learning in a practice is that apprenticeship may well be the very best way to generate
genuine disciplinary understanding.
An active and sustained participation in an apprenticeship, however, offers a far greater
opportunity for understanding [than school]. In such long-term relationships, novices
have the opportunity to witness on a daily basis the reasons for various skills, procedures,
concepts, and symbolic and notational systems. They observe competent adults moving
readily and naturally from one external or internal way of representing knowledge to
another. They experience firsthand the consequences of a misguided or misconceived
analysis, even as they gain pleasure when a well-thought-out procedure works properly.
They undergo a transition from a situation in which much of what they do is based on
adult models to one in which they are trying out their own approaches, perhaps with
some support or criticism from the master. They can discuss alternatives with more
accomplished peers, just as they can provide assistance to peers who have recently joined
the team. All these options, it seems to me, guide the student toward that state of
enablement—exhibiting the capacity to use skills and concepts in an appropriate way—
that is the hallmark of an emerging understanding.

Id. at 203 (emphasis in the original). In this account, Gardner emphasizes the length of apprentice-like
opportunities, suggesting that brief forays into disciplinary cultures may be insufficient to map relevant
norms.
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the most compelling question about a theory of ecological learning is whether critique
of dominant culture and existing institutions can occur within the context of practicebased experiences. Ultimately, I propose a version of critical reflectiveness that can
and should occur in the throes of real-life experience but these same reflective virtues
should be nurtured in the legal academy as well.
A. Current and Historical Reservations

Historically, the apprenticeship model has been challenged because of concerns
about exploitation74 and a lack of quality control75 and more recently because of
concerns about differing learning styles, risks of mimicry,76 and pervasive
unreflectiveness.77 In the legal context, these criticisms led to the near total demise
of formal apprenticeship early in the twentieth century78 and to continuing
74.

Id. at 124 (“The clouded reputation of apprenticeships probably arises in significant measure from the
fact that they were often seen as exploitative . . . .”).

75. Id. at 125.
76.		Certainly, some students will learn much more readily than others in an apprenticeship

situation, either because they have a more appropriate blend of intelligences or because
their style of learning happens to be more compatible with the teaching style of the
master. Nor do I want to contend that deep understandings will necessarily or automatically
emerge; no doubt some masters are happy to accept derivative performances, and some
students are content simply to mimic what they see before their eyes. In such a situation,
however, it is less likely that a student will radically misconstrue the nature of the desired
behaviors, and in general the model is presented in enough different ways, over a
sufficiently long period of time, that the learner eventually comes to master the desired
skill with some degree of flexibility.

Id. at 147.
77.

Id. at 125 (“Apprenticeships may result in adults who are competent but not necessarily articulate or
reflective about what they can do.”).

78. In colonial America and throughout the nineteenth century, apprenticeship was the predominant form

of legal education. See 2 Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Rise of the Legal Profession in
America 173 (1965); Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the
1850s to the 1980s 3, 24 (1983). See generally Charles R. McKirdy, The Lawyer as Apprentice: Legal
Education in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 28 J. Legal Educ. 124 (1976) (discussing the system of
legal education in early Massachusetts as described in the writings of John Adams and others); Charles
R. McManis, A History of First Century American Legal Education: A Revisionist Perspective, 59 Wash. U.
L.Q. 597, 601–06 (1981) (discussing pre-revolutionary legal education); Stephen R. Alton, Mandatory
Prelicensure Legal Internship: An Idea Whose Time Has Come Again?, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. 137, 139–43
(1992) (giving a brief history of legal apprenticeship in America). By 1938, however, the legal education
establishment succeeded in convincing almost every state that attendance at a law school was the
preferable means of access to the profession. See Stickgold, supra note 27, at 293; see also Alfred Z.
Reed, Present-Day Law Schools in the United States and Canada 209–23 (1928); Am. Bar
Ass’n Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Legal Education and Professional
Development—An Educational Continuum: Report of The Task Force on Law Schools and
the Profession 103–04 (1992) [hereinafter “MacCrate Report”] (summarizing criticism of
apprenticeship training: little training, little time spent with mentor, inadequate teaching, tedious
copying, and lack of a theoretical focus); Robert Condlin, “Tastes Great, Less Filling”: The Law School
Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. Legal Educ. 45, 73 (1986) (“Apprenticeship trivialized practice
instruction by emphasizing mundane information (e.g., where to find the proper form) and mechanical
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reservations about legal externship79 experiences, which are like the co-op, internship,
and community service placements used in many undergraduate programs. Even
with respect to these university-sponsored, practice-based programs, most clinical
commentators recycle a standard litany of reservations about apprentice-like
placements: (1) students are not getting anything other than premature exposure to a
lifetime of practice; (2) the type and variety of work is low level and trivial; (3)
students are completely at the mercy of any substandard practice and ethical
hooliganism to which they are exposed; (4) the educational focus and quality of
supervision offered by typical practitioners is highly the suspect; and (5) practitioners
are unreflective and uncritical about their practice. Each of these concerns is worth
serious consideration, both empirically and theoretically, but, in my view, the concern
about critique is most compelling and requires extended discussion. My basic
conclusion is that no matter how pervasive deficiencies in practice may be, most
students have the latent ability to recognize, critique, and reject outrageous and
unjust practices, but that the university retains an important role to encourage,
sustain, and deepen that critique.

skills (e.g., arrangement for service of process). Students were used as mere resources, or often forgotten
altogether for large parts of the time spent in their mentors’ offices.”).

		
Ultimately, the professional orthodoxy made it nearly impossible to argue that the apprenticeship
system was educationally superior to law school education, proprietary or university-based. “[N]o one
would suggest today that training for the range of demands on the profession would be best left to
apprenticeship training . . . .” Meltsner, supra note 18, at 384. But see Alton, supra note 78, at 158–63
(discussing, contrary to this pronouncement and the resounding historical critique, that a partial
apprenticeship system should be reestablished); James W. Ely, Jr., Through a Crystal Ball: Legal
Education—Its Relation to the Bench, Bar, and University Community, 21 Tulsa L.J. 650, 657 (1986)
(recommending a period of intensive supervision by practicing lawyers).

		
Despite general approval of the demise of the apprentice system, some commentators have
lamented its loss. Roscoe Pound lamented “a loss that . . . has broken the continuity of the professional
tradition, the tradition of what is done and what is not done by the good lawyer . . . .” Roscoe Pound,
The University and the Legal Profession, 7 Ohio St. L.J. 3, 26 (1941). Similarly, my colleague, Mike
Meltsner has observed, “[w]hen the legal academy split from legal practice, we lost the context in which
the process of working out the relationship between getting the job done, learning the trade, training
for the profession and mentoring took place.” Meltsner, supra note 18, at 387.

79. Although there is no universally accepted definition of externships, common features are: (1) a law

school course given for credit, (2) in which the student works in a law-related placement outside of the
law school, e.g., with a judge or in a law firm, government agency, legal service office, or advocacy
organization, (3) doing legal work with or for the placement supervisor. See Leah Wortham, American
Bar Association Externship Standards: Regulation in Search of a Theory 2 (1991) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the author). Beyond these core common features, pedagogical goals of externships,
placement settings, student commitment, and oversight by the law school vary widely from program to
program. Although externships are now widespread, the planning for externships has been either
incoherent or at least uncommunicated until quite recently. See Stickgold, supra note 27, at 321; Roger
C. Cramton, Change and Continuity in Legal Education, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 460, 464 (1981) (“[T]he
extracurricular growth of apprenticeship experiences has been largely unplanned.”). The cost of this
incoherence is quite troubling to some. “So long as the critical role of practice-based learning is allowed
to remain invisible and unplanned, the learning that comes out of this relationship will be ad hoc and
capricious.” Meltsner, supra note 18, at 385.
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1. Critiques of the Work Itself—It is Premature and Mundane

A common criticism of part-time employment, internship programs, clinical
education, and, indeed, skills training in general is that the student gains no real
benefit—all the student is doing is gaining premature experience, the same she will
have when she graduates and becomes a worker. According to these critics, “What’s
the rush?” Students should take the brief opportunity they have in school to broaden
and deepen their understanding before they smother their intellectual spark in the
drudgery of routine practice.80 This critique is made quite strenuously in multiple
sectors of the university, particularly by proponents of a liberal arts education who
believe that broad exposure to the academy’s cultural/intellectual capital is preferable
to premature exposure to a rapidly mutating practice. Rather than postulating that
this experience is premature, however, the theory of ecological learning suggests that
practice-based experience is an essential cognitive resource, one that interacts
constructively with the more crystalline forms of knowledge taught in school. Indeed,
there may be complementarity between theory and experience, a synergy between
the classroom and practice that offers a superior model of higher education. In
particular, schools may help to structure early experiences to intensify and deepen
students’ participation and capacity to engage and perform. “The fact that placement
occurs as part of an academic program provides the school with opportunities to
provide the students with structure, guidance, and insight that they would not have
if they had the same experience for the first time in practice.”81
If not premature, then the work is said to be mundane—low level and trivial. In
the legal context, anecdotal horror stories abound about students who double check
footnotes, Shepardize endless cases, summarize meaningless depositions, messenger
documents to far off locations, irradiate themselves at Xerox machines, or simply idle
away their “free time” with trash novels and summer romances.82 In addition to
triviality, some commentators worry that work assignments are too repetitive, too
narrow, and too acontextual.83 However, these “concerns about students not being
involved in worthwhile activities tend to ignore the fact that students can and usually
do object to being given menial tasks.”84
More serious is a criticism about a “free help” psychology, which allegedly plagues
some internship programs. This psychology supposedly leads to work that is
inappropriate for an educational experience—“work which can be done easily with
80. See, e.g., Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA

L. Rev. 577, 590 (1987) (making the softer point that clinical courses originally offered little more than
“earlier acquisition of real life experience”).

81.

Maher, supra note 27, at 569.

82. See Stickgold, supra note 27, at 319–20. Nonetheless, these anecdotes became the legislative facts for

regulation. See generally Maher, supra note 27, at 541 (describing “trial-by-anecdote”), 586 n.172 (“[T]he
stereotype has apparently made a significant impact on regulators.”).

83. See Henry Rose, Legal Externships: Can They Be Valuable Clinical Experiences for Law Students?, 12 Nova

L. Rev. 95, 104–05 (1987).

84. Maher, supra note 27, at 586–87.
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little training or supervision, work which is repetitive, or work which the student
already knows how to perform.”85 This danger of inappropriate work assignments is
allegedly exacerbated by students’ timidity in selecting a placement, by the danger of
student passivity, and by the desire of students to “look good” by doing only that
which they can already do. Students are said “to select work which we know we can
perform and which, therefore, is comfortable”86 —in other words, students are not
educational risk takers.
A person who considers herself an employee will be less likely to ask questions,
to take risks, to insist upon proper supervision and feedback, to request more
challenging assignments, to take time from “producing” in order to observe a
deposition or trial, to ask to sit in on a client interview, or to take the time to
read an entire case file rather than look up a narrow point of law for the
attorney.87

Although this question about the prevalence of low level work is essentially empirical,
not theoretical, our research at Northeastern University shows that students are
typically given appropriately challenging and varied work. However, when they are
not given appropriate assignments or when they cannot get clarification or when they
are left idle, their learning suffers.88
		

2. Critiques of Workplace Supervisors and Their Practice

In addition to criticizing the work that students are often asked to do in practicebased settings, critics also worry about substandard performance and ethical
hooliganism in the workplace and about the quality of supervision students receive.
“[T]he world of law office practice, like any social system, has its vulgarities, mistaken
skill notions, and untrustworthy exemplars, and experiencing it in an unexpurgated
or uninterpreted form sometimes can teach the wrong lessons.”89 In particular, there
is the danger of satisficing: “[s]tudents do not invariably learn effective practice skills
working in outside law offices; sometimes they just ‘practice their mistakes,’ and
those of their offices.”90 Thus, the critique goes, if students are exposed to substandard
practice, the risk is that they will internalize those inferior standards, that they will
learn to be content with mediocrity or worse. However, the fear that students will be
seduced by bad practice seems somewhat exaggerated. Students are not one-day-old
ducks who “imprint” with the first large animal to whom they are exposed. Moreover,
students are ordinarily exposed to more than a single performance and more than a
single performer. As discussed further below, they also have reflective and dialogic
85. Motley, supra note 27, at 214.
86. Id. at 215.
87.

Id. at 227.

88. See Givelber et al., supra note 1, at 41–42.
89. Robert Condlin, Learning From Colleagues: A Case Study in the Relationship Between “Academic” and

“Ecological” Clinical Legal Education, 3 Clinical L. Rev. 337, 343–44 (1997).

90. Id. at 345.
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capacity for evaluation and critique. If bad performances poisoned the possibility of
learning, how could we explain how so many survive or even flourish despite bad
parenting and/or bad teaching?
However, the critique of practice is not just that it may be sub-competent, but
that students are routinely exposed to unethical or immoral practice.91 For example,
based on anecdotal journal evidence collected by students working in legal externships,
Professor Hellman estimates that the majority of law students are exposed to varying
degrees of professional impropriety during a one semester, part-time externship
program. “In their practice environments, many students are exposed to unprofessional
conduct by attorneys that shocks them in terms of its frequency and seriousness.”92
“Many students saw a lawyer lie, cheat, steal, or disserve a client, frequently doing so
as if this were ‘business as usual’ in the legal profession.” 93 The net effect of this
exposure may be a lessening of students’ moral standards—a socialization to degraded
norms of practice—and a profound sense of disillusionment.94 To correct for the
immorality of practice, Hellman recommends more exposure to clinicians or other
legal educators who would boost students’ ability to withstand the contaminated
world of practice.95 “Perhaps openly confronting the students—in a protected
setting—about the reactions we now know many of them are having to their first
encounters with the practice environment could help to ‘cushion’ the ‘wall of
disillusionment’ and diminish the likelihood that students will react to this ‘collision’
by lowering their personal standards.”96
Even if there is no problem in the work that the students perform or in the
standards of performance to which they are exposed, critics argue that there is a
fundamental flaw in the educational focus and quality of supervision in most practice
settings—in the ability of students and placement supervisors to structure a
supervisory relationship, to portray an appropriate array of enviable behaviors, and to
prioritize student learning.
First, it is difficult to find outside placements for students in which the
supervising attorneys are good teachers. Most lawyers who practice are not
really interested in teaching, and even when they are, they often are not able
to take sufficient time to give students adequate instruction in the broader
issues relevant to their areas of practice. Second, in almost every outside

91.

See Lawrence K. Hellman, The Effects of Law Office Work on the Formation of Law Students’ Professional
Values: Observation, Explanation, Optimization, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 537 (1991).

92.

Id. at 543.

93.

Id. at 575.

94. Id. at 605.
95. Id. at 610 (“The analysis of the journals presented here also supports the notion that to optimize the

educational and professionalizing impact of student field placement programs, such programs should
include a law school component designed to parry the nonconstructive inf luences to which many
students are subjected in the field.”).

96. Id. at 607–08, see also Kate E. Bloch, Subjunctive Lawyering and Other Clinical Extern Paradigms, 3

Clinical L. Rev. 259 (1997) (discussing three models which externships clinicians might utilize in
responding to ethical dilemmas students experience in practice).
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placement there arises an irreconcilable tension between the demands of
clients and the educational needs of students.97

Another legal clinician expresses similar concerns: “[i]n any externship, the student
runs the risk of being assigned to a supervisor . . . who is not primarily concerned
with the student’s education or who perceives the student’s greatest value as a
researcher rather than an involved participant.”98 These same concerns are expressed
in non-legal settings as well: “most offices, factories, firms, and clinics are not set up
for the demanding tasks of initiation and education. Pressures for performance tend
to be high; time, at a premium; and mistakes, costly.” 99 Because of these alleged
inherent defects in workplace supervision, most legal clinicians argue that schoolbased clinics and supervision by clinician/educators are inherently superior to any
conceivable externship program.100 However, assuming that only clinical legal
educators can predictably supply quality supervision and then articulate or model
97.

Stephen Wizner & Dennis Curtis, Here’s What We Do: Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29
Clev. St. L. Rev. 673, 681 (1980). What Wizner and Curtis said in 1980, in-house clinicians have
repeated up to the present. “While a practitioner might be a superb lawyer, she would be unlikely to have
the training, experience, or time to devote to the teaching role that a full-time clinical teacher would.”
Subcomm. on Pedagogical Goals of In-House, Live-Client Clinics, Section One: Report of the Committee
on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. Legal Educ. 508, 511 (1992), see also Minna J. Kotkin,
Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Legal Education, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 185, 198–99 (1989); Rose,
supra note 83, at 104–05; Nina W. Tarr, Current Issues in Clinical Legal Education, 37 How. L.J. 31, 39
(1993).

98. Stacy Caplow, A Year in Practice: The Journal of a Reflective Clinician, 3 Clinical L. Rev. 1, 31 (1996).

In addition to being concerned about the absence of an educational focus, Caplow is concerned about
the variability of fieldwork supervision. “[T]his experience highlights the vagaries of externships that
rely on the good will, interest, and teaching skills of field supervisors. Differences of temperament,
workload, and values among supervisors portend erratic experiences.” Id. at 31–32.

99. Schön, Educating the Reflective Practitioner, supra note 1, at 37.
100. See Gary Laser, Significant Curricular Developments: The MacCrate Report and Beyond, 1 Clinical L.

Rev. 425, 437 (1994) (“An externship cannot substitute for an in-house live-client clinical experience,
even if combined . . . with simulation courses . . . . It is well known that during law school a student’s
professional identity is shaped. The power of a professional identity is that it sets the standard for
future practice. In an externship, the role model for that first practice experience is an outside lawyer
whose primary interests and training are not in education. In the in-house clinic, the role model is an
educator who has been selected for the high quality of his skills, values, and artistry.”), see also Caplow,
supra note 98, at 30 (“Despite having sent hundreds of students into the world to be supervised by
attorneys and judges, and having witnessed the growing acceptance of extern clinics by clinical
teachers, I remain unconvinced that these programs provide as good an academic experience as realclient clinics.”). Echoing the scholars, legal regulators seem equally concerned about the quality of
supervision and the lack of involvement of a professional legal educator in supervising the student’s
work experience.
A significant problem with credit-bearing externships is that the quality of supervision
varies considerably depending on the experience of the field placement supervisor and
the amount of time he or she is able to devote to such supervision. . . . Further steps
should be taken to require faculty involvement in the design, supervision and evaluation
of every program of extern experience, and to emphasize the critical importance of
faculty responsibility for overseeing extern programs.

MacCrate Report, supra note 78, at 271.
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appropriate norms of professional practice, reveals a form of “academic arrogance.”101
Indeed, there are multiple factors impacting and impelling the placement supervisor
to highly prize the student’s educational priorities, e.g., getting more and better work
from the student, recruiting and training students for permanent placement, relieving
the tedium of practice, or giving in to an inclination to teach or to mentor.102
Once again, the overall quality of standards, ethics, and supervision in practice is
an empirical question with few answers. With respect to the general quality of workbased supervisory experiences, our research shows that two-thirds of students are
generally satisfied with the quality of their co-op supervision.103 However, this
finding does not directly answer the question whether high quality supervision itself
is essential to learning. Indeed, when investigating this question, we were surprised
to learn that the quality of supervision was not significantly correlated with students’
assessment of the quality of their co-op as a learning experience.104
B. A Special Concern for Reflection and Critique
		

1. A New Pedagogy of Critical Reflexivity

For the most part, critics of practice-based learning assume that reflection is
absolutely necessary to learning and that students and practitioners are incapable of
reflection on their own.105 According to this critique, the expert should, but usually
does not, expose
the analysis that goes into every decision and judgment; the supervisor must
think out loud. The supervisor must then remove herself from the task at
hand and consider her choice of actions, reflecting on its effectiveness and
conformity to normative models and previously defined goals. She must
engage the student in the effort, opening herself to the same kind of critical
examination that the student is expected to develop from his own performance
in traditional clinical experiences.106

Unfortunately, according to the critics, practitioners rarely, if ever, achieve this ideal.
101. Maher, supra note 27, at 584.
102. See id. at 586.
103. Givelber et al., supra note 1, at 25.
104. Id. at 41.
105. See, e.g., Kotkin, supra note 97, at 198–99; Rose, supra note 83, at 104–05.
106. Kotkin, supra note 97, at 200–01. I have questioned the first assumption, see Baker, Beyond MacCrate,

supra note 1, at 332–48, and others have refuted the second. “Practitioners do not inevitably fail to
reflect on or generalize from their experiences, and they do not necessarily teach students shortcuts, bad
practice, or to maintain the status quo.” Maher, supra note 27, at 582. Some externship directors have
attempted to respond to the criticism of lack of reflectiveness by structuring elaborate mechanisms to
encourage student reflection. See, e.g., Liz Ryan Cole, Lessons From a Semester in Practice, 1 Clinical L.
Rev. 173 (1994) (describing a number of mechanisms designed to make her semester-in-practice students
“ref lective” including an orientation program, daily journals, conversations with the school-based
instructor, group discussions, a twenty-page paper, and a formal plan for additional learning).
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The call to ref lection in clinical legal education has echoed a broader call
throughout higher education. “In recent years, at the conf luence of streams in
experiential education and humanistic psychology, the central role of reflection in
learning has emerged.”107 From being a neglected stepchild at the fringes of adult
learning theory, reflectiveness, and its esteemed sibling critical reflectiveness, have
emerged as central players in a developmental theory of learning.108 Not only is
critical ref lection eulogized with respect to formal schooling, it is proposed for
informal community action groups109 and the workplace as well.110
Even within reflectiveness, however, there is a familiar hierarchy of respectability
favoring conscious reflection and theory, proposed most cogently by Jack Mezirow.
At the lower end of the spectrum, not even within the meritocracy of reflectiveness,
is thoughtful action—cognition-in-practice—merely drawing on what one already
knows in order to act.111 Conscious reflection, next highest on the pecking order, can
occur during-the-fact to reassess what one is doing or after-the-fact to evaluate what
one has done, including a critical appraisal of assumptions about the contours of the
problem and the process of selecting resources and reaching a solution.112 The highest
107. Philip C. Candy, Self-Direction for Lifelong Learning: A Comprehensive Guide to Theory

and Practice 390 (1991). “Boyd and Fales define ref lective learning as ‘the process of internally
examining and exploring an issue of concern, triggered by an experience, which creates and clarifies
meaning in terms of self, and which results in a changed conceptual perspective.’” Id. (citation omitted).

108. See Jack Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning (1991); Fostering Critical

Reflection in Adulthood: A Guide to Transformative and Emancipatory Learning 1, 4
( Jack Mezirow & Associates eds., 1990) [hereinafter Fostering Critical Reflection in
Adulthood]; Hart, supra note 32; Stephen D. Brookfield, Developing Critical Thinkers:
Challenging Adults to Explore Alternative Ways of Thinking and Acting (1987) (urging a
critical perspective at home, at work, and about the media); David Deshler, Metaphor Analysis: Exorcising
Social Ghosts, in Fostering Critical Reflection in Adulthood, supra (urging that people exorcise
the ghosts of socialization and that they freely choose meaning and action); Peter Jarvis, Paradoxes
of Learning: On Becoming an Individual in Society 94–97, 113–15 (1992) (also urging a critical
perspective as the highest attainment of learning). Of course, the call to reflectiveness is not brand new
—John Dewey urged reflection to assess the grounds and implications of one’s beliefs way back in 1933.
John Dewey, How We Think 9 (1933). Paulo Freire urged a reflective and transformative pedagogy in
the early 1970’s. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed 202 (1970). Mezirow, in particular,
draws heavily on Jurgen Habermas in constructing his recent theory of transformative education. See
Mezirow, supra at 64–68, 71–72, 86–88. Mezirow has added a developmental twist that critical
reflectivity is a developmental stage through which most adult learners pass as the ultimate stage of a
developmental process.

109. Thomas W. Heaney & Aimee I. Horton, Reflective Engagement for Social Change, in Fostering

Critical Reflection in Adulthood, supra note 108, at 74.

110. Victoria J. Marsick, Action Learning and Reflection in the Workplace, in Fostering Critical Reflection

in Adulthood, supra note 108, at 23.

111. See Jack Mezirow, How Critical Reflection Triggers Transformative Learning, in Fostering Critical

Reflection in Adulthood, supra note 108, at 1, 4.

112. Id. Mezirow defines reflection as “the process of critically assessing the content, process, or premise(s)

of our efforts to interpret and give meaning to an experience.” Mezirow, supra note 108, at 104.
“Reflection is the central dynamic in intentional learning, problem solving, and validity testing through
rational discourse.” Id. at 99.
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form of reflection, however, is critical reflection where the learner surfaces, reflects
upon, and challenges underlying premises—the products of socialization, personal
ideology, and systems of meaning-making which were used to frame the problem
and to describe the learner’s implicit social role and activity.113 Hart proposes a
further and sharper terminal level of critique than that proposed by Mezirow:
the very meaning of ‘critique’ or ‘critical’ refers to the process of questioning
the reality and validity of a social consensus concerning beliefs, values, and
assumptions. In particular, critique aims at the illumination of a false
consensus which, within a hierarchically organized, divided, and stratified
society, is but the consensus of an élite.114

Unlike regular ref lection, which can occur in the commotion of experience,
critical reflection, according to Mezirow, requires “a hiatus;”115 thus, it necessarily
takes place after-the-fact, in moments of calm. Even though critical ref lection
requires a time out, it ordinarily entails a potentially threatening reappraisal of
fundamental premises, even of one’s conception of self.116 Mezirow proposes that
perspective transformation can occur through accretion of minor schematic
destabilizations that challenge more foundational perspectives or in response to major
disorienting dilemmas of life.117 Since perspective transformation118 is ordinarily the
response most valued by reflectionists, individual or collective transformation is the
highest attainment of critical reflection. According to Mezirow, this transformation
of perspective is initially facilitated by creating a dialogic community that engages in
rational discourse to challenge, to investigate, and to validate or reformulate ideas;
113. See Mezirow, supra note 111, at 6–7, 12–18. “[B]ecoming critically aware of our own presuppositions

involves challenging our established and habitual patterns of expectation, the meaning perspectives
with which we have made sense out of our encounters with the world, others, and ourselves.” Id. at 12.
Mezirow refers to critical self-ref lection as “[b]y far the most significant learning experiences in
adulthood.” Id. at 13.

		
Mezirow proposes that the distorted premises might be of three types: epistemic, concerning the
nature and use of knowledge; sociocultural, concerning dominant ideologies of power and social privilege;
and psychic, resulting from unwarranted childhood anxieties or other traumas. Id. at 15–17. Developmental
changes in epistemological premises is discussed at greater length in Karen S. Kitchener & Patricia M.
King, The Reflective Judgment Model: Transforming Assumptions About Knowing, in Fostering Critical
Reflection in Adulthood, supra note 108, at 159. Challenges to sociocultural ideologies are discussed
in Mechthild U. Hart, Liberation Through Consciousness Raising, in Fostering Critical Reflection in
Adulthood, supra note 108, at 47; Hart, supra note 32; Heaney & Horton, supra note 109. A therapeutic
computer program used to challenge psychic premises is discussed in Roger L. Gould, The Therapeutic
Learning Program, in Fostering Critical Reflection in Adulthood, supra note 108, at 134.
114. Hart, supra note 32, at 66.
115. Mezirow, supra note 111, at 13.
116. Id. at 12–13.
117. Id. at 13–14.
118. Perspective transformation is the process of becoming critically aware of how and why our presuppositions

have come to constrain the way we perceive, understand, and feel about our world; of reformulating
these assumptions to permit a more inclusive, discriminating, permeable, and integrative perspective;
and of making decisions or otherwise acting upon these new understandings. Id. at 14.
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after transformation of ideas, the next step may be to transfer vision into action,
nurturing the will to act individually and collectively.119
Mezirow clearly urges a change in praxis, though, according to him, it cannot be
forced. Nonetheless, Mezirow believes that educators have a moral and pedagogical
obligation to facilitate and precipitate transformative practice. “[E]very adult educator
has a responsibility for fostering critical self-reflection and helping learners plan to
take action.”120 The responsibility is neither one of indoctrination nor of engineering
a favored action.121 It is, however, a role of being an “empathetic provocateur.”122 As
an educator, however, Mezirow is content to leave that ultimate decision, whether to
enact transformation, to the learner.
However, Mezirow is criticized for not being more proactive about existing social
relations and urging an explicit program of social change. “Despite a vocabulary of
reflection, participation, and empowerment, underlying structures of a hierarchical
and unequitable organization and distribution of work remain intact.”123 In contrast
to Mezirow’s cognitive and social process theory of transformation, Hart has a
substantive vision of social change, arguing that “we can arrive at a notion of ‘good
work’ which is not constructed from the privileged, exclusive reality of a maleidentified élite, thus freeing the notion of success from its bond with an inherently
unjust, stratified social reality, characterized by an unequal system of rewards and
privileges.”124 Hart urges actual social transformation. “The effort of truth-seeking is
a profoundly transformative one, where knowledge about one’s self and about the
world is constantly recreated in view of a future society.”125 “Above all, it makes visible
‘the key phenomena of social and economic injustice’ which are otherwise considered
mere exceptions [to the prevailing social order].”126 In this explicit call to the praxis
of social action and transformation, Hart joins Paulo Freire, who likewise urges
critical awareness in the cause of social change.127
		

2. Reformulating Claims About Reflectiveness

According to Mezirow’s “ref lective” learning theory, without ref lectiveness
experience remains inert, devoid of new meaning, consisting solely of the ritualistic
reenactments of habit. Without reflection, humans allegedly become marionettes in
the hands of powerful social puppeteers; without reflection, humans allegedly march
119. Jack Mezirow, Conclusion: Toward Transformative Learning and Emancipatory Education, in Fostering

Critical Reflection in Adulthood, supra note 111, at 354, 354–55.

120. Id. at 357.
121. Id. at 360–63.
122. Id. at 360.
123. Hart, supra note 32, at 63.
124. Id. at 64.
125. Id. at 198.
126. Id. at 202 (citation omitted).
127. See Freire, supra note 108.
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forward lockstep with the quiet, subconscious steamroller of acculturation. To avoid
these dehumanizing possibilities, reflectionists insist that learners and novices must
learn to reflect. Only through reflection can change occur and only through change
can we measure what these educators call learning.128 Accordingly, reflective learning
is the “cardinal virtue” of adult education.129
Of course, there is a strange circularity in the elevation of reflectiveness when
adult-learning theorists, like Mezirow, define learning only as “conscious” learning.
Using this definition, Mezirow defines away the possibility of subconscious, subpropositional learning and of purposeful but un-self-aware practice. He defines away
the accretion of experience and the intuitive, instantaneous emergence of pattern. He
also defines away gestalt coherence, metaphor, and intuitive leaps. He further defines
away the evocative particularity of setting and self and the pulsing web of connection
and social discourse which, in themselves, transactionally transform phenomenological
experience, its interpretation, and its social explication. He similarly defines away the
dialectical relation130 of social arena, human actor, and situational dilemma, which
construct a field of action,131 not through propositional rules but through subtle
dynamics of tension, conflict, and ambiguity.
Likewise, once Mezirow defines learning as dependant on change,132 he defines
away the “learning value” of preserving adaptive, even optimally adaptive, responses.
He defines away the possibility that inventing the wheel once may be preferable to
reinventing it every time you have to go someplace. He ignores or downplays many of
the virtues of cognitive economy, gestalt coherence, reduced anxiety, routine

128. Mezirow, supra note 111, at 5 (“Much of what we learn involves making new interpretations that enable

us to elaborate, further differentiate, and reinforce our long-established frames of reference or to create
new meaning schemes.”).

129. Mezirow, supra note 108, at 111, 117.
130. In simplest terms, a dialectical relationship is more than cause and effect between two or more terms; it

is a relation where the terms are brought into being only in conjunction with and in conflict with each
other, thereafter structuring many potential and actual resting points or resolutions. See Lave, supra
note 1, at 145–46 (using the example that shelf displays and shoppers’ choices in a grocery market stand
is a dialectical relationship in grocery shopping). Dialectical relations are rarely symmetrical and thus
the possibilities of routine reproduction, modest transformation, or radical change will vary from
practice setting to practice setting, from activity to activity, and from human actor to human actor. See
id. at 147–48.

131. In discussing the social organization of human activity, Lave speaks of the constitutive order of cultural

semiotic systems and the material, social world of political economy and social structure; this constitutive
order helps structure social arenas which in turn help structure settings, i.e. fields of action. See id. at
178–80.

132. “Learning may be understood as the process of using a prior interpretation to construe a new or a revised

interpretation of the meaning of one’s experiences in order to guide future action.” Mezirow, supra note
108, at 12. Admittedly, Mezirow, does not think that all reflective learning requires transformation of
premises—“Reflective learning can be either confirmative or transformative.” Id. at 111. Nonetheless,
he does argue that reflection on underlying premises ordinarily “leads to more fully developed meaning
perspectives . . . .” Id.
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performance, and some degree of social continuity and convention.133 Mezirow, in
his conception of conscious change, also overestimates the monolithic reproduction
of culture. His conception of cultural uniformity suggests the smooth reproduction
of a single culture from one generation to the next and far too little variation of
experience based on cultural difference, pluralism, rebellion, and change.134
Finally, Mezirow assumes that reflection and self-examination are accurate, that
when one reflects on experience and interprets it linguistically one extracts its true
meaning and thus its only valuable lesson, e.g., learning. This assumption has been
routinely disproven by researchers in the lab and in the field.135 Not only does
Mezirow assume that reflection extracts truth from experience and from the mind
itself, he also assumes that the resulting interpretative “truth” is ordinarily unitary
and definitive, even if temporarily provisional. Rather than suggesting that reflection
might produce multiple meanings, Mezirow suggests instead that the old, bad,
habituated, and implicit meaning of experience is replaced by the higher, deeper,
truer, conscious meaning discovered through reflection. Mezirow valorizes reflection
further by calling this new meaning theory—theory distilled from crude experience,
past and present, through the heat of reflection.136
On the more positive side, Mezirow’s reflectionist theory assumes, correctly I think,
that critical reflectiveness, as a disposition, happens—people are capable of criticizing
their culture. Moreover, he is right that critical reflection seems to be developmental—
something that adults can ordinarily do as the result of their multiple experiences and
that children can ordinarily not do.137 However, his analysis also assumes, incorrectly I
133. Given our biological imperative for conserving energy, including cognitive energy, given our biological

imperative to reduce chaos and anxiety, and given our biological preference for action-readiness,
coherence, and closure, it is especially odd to systematically privilege slow consciousness over
instantaneous patterned coherence. Moreover, the very existence of a social system necessarily imposes
some degree of continuity. “The constitutive order and everyday practice together reflect and constitute
the distribution of power and interest such that, in general, reproduction of activity in setting is much
more likely than its transformation or change.” Lave, supra note 1, at 188–89.

134. Id. at 10. In particular the concept of cultural uniformity “legislates away major questions about social

diversity, inequality, conflict, complementarity, cooperation and differences of power and knowledge . . . .”
Id.

135. See Baker, Beyond MacCrate, supra note 1, at 338–40 and sources cited.
136. Mezirow, supra note 111, at 360.

Id.

Implicit throughout this book is the finding that theory building may derive from
encounter and challenge in either the context of social action or in an educational
setting with significant learning experiences as points of departure. . . . [A]nalysis of
incidents from different perspectives leads to critical assessment, this leads to
interpretation, which, in turn, leads to explanation and the formulation of theory . . . .

137. Mezirow, supra note 108, at 155 (“It should be clear that a strong case can be made for calling

perspective transformation the central process of adult development.”); see also Kitchener & King, supra
note 113, at 159 (proposing this developmental perspective in their study of epistemological
presumptions). This part of the analysis may be correct simply because children ordinarily lack a depth
of experience and because critical reflectiveness is not frequently displayed to them in the autocratic rule
of adults. Id.
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think, that adults can be deeply critical about that with which they are unfamiliar simply
because they have learned to be critical somewhere else. Mezirow assumes that critical
reflexivity is a transferable cognitive skill and one that is easily and routinely enacted
regardless of impoverished experience or situational constraint.
An equally plausible explanation, however, and one that is quite consistent with
existing data, is that people might become more critically reflective about the wide
range of practices and the culture of a domain only after a sufficient degree of
experience with a particular context or form of practice. For example, Hart
recommends a learning rhythm “which alternates between short-term learning
processes where information is gathered and accumulated and technical skills and
abilities are shaped, and long-term learning processes where one’s sense of self, one’s
meaning perspective, and the parameters of experience itself are transformed.”138
Otherwise, the critic is merely repeating a pro forma or “structural” critique born in
a different cultural context, but potentially ill adapted and uninformed in the present
context—the critique risks being lifeless and abstract.
Despite delays in meaningfully critiquing the culture of a domain until one has
amassed some experience, novices are nonetheless capable and cognitively predisposed
to criticize their process of acculturation, even their unconscious, osmotic acculturation.139
Since cognition is highly attuned to the novel and the problematic, this form of reflection
on acculturation remains a vital resource when entering a new knowledge or practice
domain. Accordingly, my image of social participation and of critical enculturation
within a practice domain is that one must enter the “donut” of context from the outside
via repeated functional experience in order for meaningful substantive reflection to
occur. Once inside, however, and once one is habituated to the activities, landmarks,
and canons of donut-land, one might use critical reflection and critical dialogue to find
the hole in the donut and thereby gain a different and valuable perspective—to become
post-conventional in forms of practice and transformational in social vision. Whether
this critical reflectiveness emerges organically from the well-springs of patterned
experience or whether it needs to be learned, facilitated, and prompted remains to be
seen, though I suspect that it emerges both through our longing for coherence and
through our interactive social imperative to communicate and validate our experiences
with others, an imperative that can occur both within and outside of the classroom.140
Thus, it might be better to interpret reflection, even critical reflection, as a kind
of mental habit, one with evolutionary benefit,141 that acts as an additional cognitive,
138. Hart, supra note 32, at 214.
139. See Baker, Beyond MacCrate, supra note 1, at 348.
140. This conclusion is not much different from Mezirow’s developmental thesis.
141. Mezirow also seems to recognize the evolutionary benefit of critical reflectiveness.

Our need to make and transform meaning appears to be orthogenetic in nature—that
is, to imitate inevitable patterns of biological development. Each transformation of a
meaning scheme or perspective makes more efficient use of energy and generates its
own reinforcement because the resulting behavioral pattern is better integrated and
more open to new ideas, which provides for greater adaptational efficiency.
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affective, and dispositional heuristic facilitating both coherence and change.142 Under
this conception, conscious reflection is not the only form of cognition that we might
privilege with the label “learning.” Ref lection would not be the only source of
coherence, but rather one of many, nothing more than a “normal” feature of
consciousness and sociability. Nonetheless, a transformative vision, whether “natural”
or facilitated, must be complemented with an imperative for transformational
practice.143 This emphasizes the praxis of social change, taking critique beyond the
mind and the world of talk. Transformational practice places critique in the world of
action, in the difficult practicalities and judgments of an actual social setting. A
perspective of transformational practice asks not just what you think and say, but
what you can and should do.
		

3. Proposals for Critique from the Law School

The legal writers who urge a critical perspective on the law are, like Mezirow, for
the most part, legal progressives who uses the intellectual tools of Marxism,
structuralism, and postmodernism to destabilize support for the status quo. Critical
legal studies, critical feminism, critical race theory, and queer theory all point to
abhorrent social conditions and codified power imbalances which privilege some and
radically disadvantage others. They distrust formalistic conceptions of the rule of law
and they question legal institutions, prevailing forms of legal practice, and legal
culture; at the same time, they advocate resistance and interstitial change. These
critics recommend using reflective spaces within the legal academy for students to
criticize the basic assumptions and practices of the American legal system.144
A growing number of commentators are also urging critique, radical critique, as
one of the primary justifications for practical legal experience during law school; they
Mezirow, supra note 108, at 193.
142. Ref lection would be a cognitive heuristic because it would require you to double-check a patterned

response that might be suboptimal in responding to the present dilemma. In this view, even though
your reflection might not be entirely accurate in accessing and interpreting preconscious processes, it
would permit an opportunity to reinterpret the sociocultural setting, the problem-space, the problem
itself, the potential solutions considered, the solution enacted, and the observed outcome. Reflection
would be a social heuristic because it would permit you to articulate and communicate with others the
meaning you have provisionally made of your experience, actual or anticipated. That dialogue can
expose you, even through the stilted, decontextualism of language, to alternative meanings and
perspectives that might expand or deepen your horizons of coherence about past, present, and future
experience.

143. Hart, supra note 32, at 64.
144. See, e.g., Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century’s End, 43 J. Legal Educ. 27 (1993). The call to criticism

has not gone unopposed and the strongest opponents have chastised “nihilists” who threaten both legal
education and society at large. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. Legal Educ.
222 (1984). Dean Carrington’s attack on “nihilist” critique, in turn, calls forth a spirited rebuttal. See,
e.g., Gary Minda, Of Law, the River, and Legal Education, 10 Nova L. Rev. 705 (1986). I must resist any
urge to accurately summarize and footnote the extensive critical legal literature urging “critique” as the
highest value of human thought. Clearly, this literature exists in abundance. For a thoughtful article
applying critical ethnography to education as a whole, see Gary L. Anderson, Critical Ethnography in
Education: Origins, Current Status, and New Directions, 59 Rev. Educ. Res. 249 (1989).
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want critique to occur in and about law offices as well as within the calm classrooms
of the academy.145 One of the early proponents of a critical perspective and of the
special opportunity for critique in externship programs was Robert Condlin, who
like many clinicians, put critique at or near the top of the hierarchy of goals for
clinical legal education.146 One aspect of this critique is an ethical dialogue; another
concerns alternative visions of lawyering roles and client decisionmaking; yet another
aspect of critique is more substantive and concerns power.147 The net impact of this
critical perspective is that legal culture and society at large need deconstruction and
reconstruction—dismantling privilege and hoarded wealth, reconfiguring respectful
human relations, and increasing racial, social, and economic justice.
Even when one credits the value or centrality of critique, there are many questions
still waiting to be answered. Is the value of critique best achieved by focusing on
individual practices148 or should the students/novices reflect on the practices of others
so that they are less defensive and can have a broader range of vicarious experiences
to explore? Are externships and other practice-based opportunities a good place for
students to gain the nut of experience for critique149 or would students be better off
145. In many ways, critique was one of the generative forces for the clinical movement. It was the social and

political activists of the 1960s who both populated the legal service clinics and articulated the rationale
for a public-service based clinical opportunity. “Clinical education has been inextricably tied to serving
poor people. Although few law schools had clinics before the 1960s, the major stimulus for many
programs that developed during the 1960s and early 1970s was the desire to serve the needs of the
unrepresented, to sensitize students to their ethical and moral responsibilities to society, to train students
in poverty law practice, and to give law schools a role in their communities.” Tarr, supra note 97, at 32.
Certainly, there is an argument that the roots of the clinical movement in the social activism of the
1960s evidences a commitment to “teaching about use of the law as an instrument of social change,
awareness of injustices in the treatment of poor people, and legal problems and institutions encountered
by poor people.” Wortham, supra note 79, at 20.

146. Condlin supra note 78, at 50. “Political critique is the most important clinical objective for several

reasons. . . . Critique is a university’s reason for being . . . . Stripped of its critical role, the university is
a mere socializing agent, an instrument of prevailing orthodoxy, engaged only in legitimation and
control.” Id. at 50. Other clinicians before and after Condlin have emphasized the importance, even the
centrality, of a critical perspective. See, e.g., Wortham, supra note 79, at 21; Spiegel, supra note 80, at
601; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Two Contradictory Criticisms of Clinical Education: Dilemmas and Directions
in Surveying Education, 4 Antioch L.J. 287, 294–99 (1986). Stanley Fish would accuse these clinicians
as hopeless idealists (in both senses) just as he has criticized critical legal studies proponents for their
“anti-foundationalist theory hope.” See Stanley Fish, Critical Self-Consciousness, Or Can We Know What
We Are Doing?, in Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the
Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies 436, 458–65 (1989). Nonetheless, the question
of critical reflexivity remains a central concern in education. See Anderson, supra note 144, at 254–55.

147. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 33, at 857–904 and sources cited.
148. Condlin, supra note 78, at 47 n.6.

[I]f one is interested in a moral philosophy of lawyering it is necessary to deal with
these questions in the first person. Moral understanding is arrived at by critical
ref lection on activities that have been experienced pre-ref lectively and begun to be
internalized as dispositions. . . . Without the experience of acting in lawyer role moral
philosophizing will be just so many words.

Id. at 66–67.

149. See id. at 47 n.6; Maher, supra note 27, at 583–84; Rose, supra note 83, at 103.
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in the clinic,150 or in a problem-method or simulation classroom? Can students
maintain enough “distance” in the practice setting to be an anthropologist of the law,
assuming anthropological distance and neutrality are appropriate?151 Conversely, if
students are unable to engage in critique of practice in the real world,152 is there little
long-lasting advantage to doing it in the classroom?153 This range of questions does
not cause me to question the desirability of critique, social action, and reform, but
merely reminds me that we have only tentative theory or data that reliably predicts
where critique can most meaningfully occur.154
IV. CONCLUSION

A representation of town/gown dilemma in higher education could suggest a
simple opposition between law school-based and practice-based learning. Although a
stark rendering of an oppositional dilemma might prompt a healthy debate, a
simplistic dichotomy cannot capture the complexity of the dilemma(s) that educators,
150. Condlin’s espousal of external placement as a superior setting for receiving the experiential nut for

critique was quickly critiqued in turn.

Structurally, in-house clinics are in some ways better situated to provide critique than
are placement programs. The clinical professor is on the scene, whereas placement
programs face a substantial problem of retrieval. Unless the student tells the clinical
professor about a lie or a rout, these subjects will not be discussed.

Kenney Hegland, Condlin’s Critique of Conventional Clinics: The Case of the Missing Case, 36 J. Legal
Educ. 427, 429 (1986).
151. The critical clinical student is more of (though not completely) an anthropologist than a native. He

becomes part of the lawyer society, but also maintains enough emotional and intellectual distance to
allow him to analyze that society’s practices for their political and moral biases, presuppositions, and
effects. He tries to understand why things are done as they are and enlarge his sense of what could be
done, rather than internalize as habit what is commonly accepted. Condlin, supra note 78, at 53 n.24.

152. Despite Condlin’s emphasis on the student’s experience and personal critical insights, Condlin envisions

an externship law school educator as a central player in an ethical dialogue. Although I agree that law
professors should be engaged in ethical and critical dialogue about the practices of others, in fact the
only person who can effectively model a realistic ideal of the reflective, critical practitioner is the lawyer,
legislator, or judge who is critical and self-critical in day-to-day practice. This practitioner operates
under multiple and contradictory constraints which confound and inform her critique and which help
her reach that level of accommodation and resistance which defines her present place in legal culture.
See Anderson, supra note 144, at 256–57 (discussing resistance theory).

153. Condlin, supra note 78, at 71 (stating that “[i]f it is possible to live a full, critical life of the mind in the

practice of law, it must be possible and it is certainly necessary to show how this is done in an actual law
office,” even if it is done so only infrequently). Some of the limited data to date on the willingness of
practicing lawyers to reflect with students on the legal system, the lawyer’s work, and ethical issues,
suggests that lawyers do so only occasionally. Donald N. Zillman & Vickie R. Gregory, Law Student
Employment and Legal Education, 36 J. Legal Educ. 390, 394 (1986) (reporting that lawyers discussed
legal ethic issues—most of the time (10%), occasionally (42%), never (47%)). Although the frequency
with which practicing lawyers discuss critique with their students is obviously less than would be
optimally desirable, it would be interesting to compare these results with a study of how frequently
classroom teachers engage in serious critique in the classroom.

154. The easiest answer is that critique should occur wherever it can. Karl E. Klare, The Law-School

Curriculum in the 1980s: What’s Left?, 32 J. Legal Educ. 336, 343 (1982).
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learners, and practitioners face in understanding and then restructuring classrooms,
curricula, and pedagogies and in facilitating, monitoring, and debriefing clinics,
internships, co-ops, and service activities. The relation between the legal classroom
and law practice is not simply hierarchical, one being more important than the other;
the relationship might partly be one of two worlds apart and in other respects it
might be collaborative, interactive, synergistic, or mutually constitutive.
In any event, the legal academy is much more familiar with the education-centric
and school-based side of the town/gown debate, but is seriously under informed
about student learning in practice. Through co-ops, internships, clinical placements,
community service projects, and part-time employment, law students undergo a
dynamic process of acculturation where new roles, group purposes, institutional
arrangements, and cultural norms contribute to something clearly identifiable as
learning—but university-based educators tend to ignore it. Thus, this article suggests
that academics need to consider a more social, more contextual, and more experiential
theory of practice-based learning that emphasizes the primacy of practice—a theory
that privileges situated learning in practice over decontextualized learning in school.
Despite my strong support for practice-based learning, it has its critics and its
dangers. At its worst, practice-based experience, professional and otherwise, can
consist of a numbing exposure to mundane and trivial tasks, to the grunt-work
underside of business and professional practice. Practice-based settings where
students are given peripheral responsibilities, make-work, or, even worse, no work at
all are deeply debilitating and certainly not worth the tuition dollars and opportunity
costs they entail. Similarly, co-op and other forms of practice-based learning can
introduce students to minimally competent and sub-ethical practice. Although there
are many superb practitioners in all fields who internalize and enforce high standards,
there are other practitioners and placement settings where satisficing is sufficient
and where ethical corners are cut to the quick. Many students in such placements
may reject the practice model to which they are exposed and can learn by negative
example, but others may socialize themselves to lazy and amoral standards. Finally,
the world is not an equitable place; institutions reproduce hierarchy and unjust
practices abound. In their desire to fit in and through the process of socialization
itself, students may not learn how to resist and contest the status quo—students may
merely acquiesce and accommodate. Thus, a challenge remains, for students,
supervisors, and the academy as well, to foster critical consciousness and catalyze
transformation in the academy and in practice.
At the end of my analysis, I remain deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, I am
certain that practice-based learning is valuable, perhaps essential, to the development
of both understanding and competence. A theory of ecological learning helps explain
how and why practice-based learning works. On the other hand, my overall impression
is that lawyers, law professors, myself included, and law students are all too complacent
about existing legal structures and social arrangements. This complacency extends
throughout higher education and throughout all practice domains, though there are
always rebels in our midst. It is disturbing that the morally complacent practitioner
has both been through school and been immersed in practice (as has his or her
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university counterpart). The dangers of uncritical acculturation are all too obvious,
but the antidote is not. Accordingly, in order to reduce the dangers of “co-op”tation,
we should encourage our students to maintain a critical perspective on their process
of acculturation, before, during, and after their practice-based experiences. We should
help them explore forms of accommodation and resistance in practice-based activities
that encourage and strengthen their commitment to social transformation and their
ability to engage constructively in social change.
No discussion of critique in the real world can succeed if we do not analyze the
powerful social forces arrayed against change that are deployed to maintain existing
legally constituted regimes of power and privilege. Resistors get disciplined,
whistleblowers get fired, and reformers get marginalized and repressed. Accordingly,
an ethic and practice of individual reflective critique often gets tamed into dinner
table rants and mere expression of dissent. Though the topic of actualized critique, of
organized resistance is beyond the scope of this article, it will usually be true that
lawyers who want to see real progressive social change will have to ally themselves
with social movements. How is that for a tall order?
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